The following two posts just link to the various topical pages of my blog for anyone who has the time to burn reading my older posts. If you do, enjoy.

Some year old yet still relevant thoughts on Illegal Immigration

I probably should have done this earlier seeing as the Senate has somehow managed to bow to public opinion on illegal immigration already. At any rate, since this is a major issue of the day here are a three posts I wrote about last years "comprehensive immigration reform" that work equally well today.

The first compares the economic dislocation of mass low-skill illegal immigration to the Latifundia of ancient Rome which were instrumental in destroying the Roman Republic's economy.

The second compares the social upheavel mass low-skill illegal immigration to the social upheavel caused by the mass importation of barbarian foederati to the late Roman Empire.

The third and last one deals with my ideas for dealing with illegal immigration. Some of it is standard fare, secure the border and attrit, but some of it is new I think (I can't be certain of course) such as a plan to fly captured illegals to southern Mexico instead of bussing them to the other side of the border and an idea for every increasing terms at a detention center (1 month second time, 2 months third time, etc.).

Even though the Senate ended the President's dreams of being "El Grande Gringo" this is still an important issue of course. Although we are in no where near as bad a position as ancient Rome on this issue I think history, and common sense, shows it could potentially cause major crises down the road.

Enter Hu Jin-Tirpitz and the Sino-American Naval Race

China’s President Hu Jintao recently gave a speech stating that, “The navy force should be strengthened and modernized... to serve the country and its people more effectively.” This doesn’t quite have the symbolic or real world impact of “a fleet second to none” or “a place in the sun” but it also isn’t something we can blithely ignore. Even though China will not be able to challenge the US and Japan on the seas for some time, they are preparing for that day. They are building modern ships, submarines, and power projection capabilities at a decent rate. This buildup will soon place China third in the world in modern and semi-modern vessels (2005: China-25 ships/19 subs, US-123/52, Japan-44/16, Russia-27/36 poorly maintained, UK-27/9, France-18/6, and India-17/13). This naval expansion is nothing new or evil. The Franco-English and Anglo-German naval races of years past were very similar in many respects. The players have changed but the game is the same. A new great power arises and discovers that a first-class great power requires a powerful fleet to protect its security. This powerful fleet invariably threatens the security of already existing great powers. At this point one of 4 things happen (example naval race from history, my guesstimate of it happening today):

1) Current great power accepts the hit to its security and gives up (Anglo-US, possible but not likely I would think/hope),
2) New great power does the same and gives up (US-USSR, not happening),
3) New great power doesn’t want to wait the 30 or so years it takes to build a powerful fleet, so they develop “risk theories” that they think allows them to mount an early challenge the current great power with the superior fleet (Anglo-German & US-Japan, most likely given China's actions and moves).
4) New great power does wait 30 years while it builds up its fleet (Anglo-Dutch, China's best choice, depends on if Beijing can hold off on Taiwan for the next 20 years, given that and the fact that this is somewhat rare historically I don't think it's too likely but we'll see).

It is very easy to dismiss China’s naval growth, as the Chinese would like us to, because it pales in comparison to the strength of the mighty US Navy. Also, there is the excellent Japanese navy to consider. However, China’s naval buildup should be closely observed and if need be countered for two reasons. Firstly China doesn’t need to match the American and Japanese navies ship for ship and crew for crew. China, like von Tirpitz’s Germany, understands that all they need to do is raise the risk of confronting China to an unacceptable level for us and Japan. This only requires close approximation and not full parity or superiority between the Chinese navy and the US Pacific Fleet and Japanese navy. The second reason follows from the fact that it will be the US Pacific Fleet and not the US Navy as China’s opponent. What this means is that while China’s entire navy will be used in a conflict, we will only be able to send a portion of ours due to global commitments and distance from our main ports. Unless we increase the size of our fleet we will have to steadily weaken ourselves elsewhere to provide the margin we need against China. Unfortunately, with the exception of India in the Indian Ocean, there are not many good nations to take our place in their region if we withdraw. Britain was forced to withdraw from the Americas and East Asia to deal with Germany in 1914. She at least was able to hand power over to like-minded countries. Although even with like-minded countries this would turn out badly for Britain since Japan turned violent with the Royal Navy absent.

The overall growth of the Chinese surface fleet does not at first glance look impressive. Its total strength is expected to grow from 19 destroyers and 40 frigates in 2000 to 28 destroyers and 42 frigates in 2015. However, all but one of the ships in 2000 was obsolescent and most would have been little more than target hulks for the US Navy in the event of a conflict. By 2005 China’s count of modern ships had grown to 6 destroyers and 2 frigates. This is expected to grow to 14 destroyers and 8 frigates by 2015. At the same time China is adding semi-modern vessels that could still pack a punch when paired with modern ships. This intermediate category will likely grow from 2 destroyers and 6 frigates to 3 destroyers and 14 frigates in 2015. At some point, globalsecurity.org says 2010 but others say after 2020, the Chinese fleet will receive its first aircraft carrier. It’s expected to be about half the size of a US carrier at around 48,000 tons displacement and 24 fighters. These estimates are from before Hintao’s speech calling for more navy funding so the real figures will likely be higher.

More critical to China’s ability to simply damage the US Navy severely enough that we won’t challenge them are submarines. In 2000, China actually possessed more attack subs than the US, though again most were obsolete (Chinese copies of Soviet copies of German WWII designs). Of China’s 64 attack subs in 2000, 5 were semi-modern nuclear attack subs (the Han-class) and 5 were modern conventional attack subs (Kilo-class and a Song-class). In 2005 China had 1 modern and 5 semi-modern nuclear attack subs, and 13 modern conventional attack subs. According to older estimates these numbers should be 6 modern and 5 semi-modern nuclear attack subs, and 29 modern conventional attack subs in 2015. The growth of the modern conventional attack sub force is perhaps the most worrisome aspect for the US Navy. Modern conventional attack subs are extraordinarily difficult to find and track. Japanese, Australian, and Swedish conventional subs regularly manage to get within strike distance of a US carrier in wargames without being discovered. Any thoughts that this was a feat that only well trained crews in the most advanced subs could perform were dispelled a few months ago when a Chinese sub trailed a US carrier from 5 miles away without being noticed. The fact that this incident took place near Okinawa further shows the greater ranges at which the Chinese sub force is capable of operating.

The Chinese are not focusing on glamorous new ships and subs while neglecting the more mundane aspects of naval power projection. Their amphibious fleet has undergone a radical improvement in its capabilities. Prior to 2000 most of China’s amphibious vessels were WWII American designs. The 26 large amphibious ships they had in 2000 could carry a max load of 15,600 soldiers (although they would carry less than that depending on the supplies they would need to take with them). In 2005 this has expanded to 33 ships with a 21,600 soldier capacity and will be at least 52 ships and 31,200 soldier capacity by 2015. No fleet can operate far from home without underway replenishment vessels accompanying them. This area of the Chinese navy will see its 2000 total of 3 ships and 34,200 tons of cargo capacity grow to 5 ships with a cargo capacity of 57,000 tons in the near future. There don’t appear to be any further plans for expansion beyond that, but again these are only estimates and something like a cargo vessel could be ordered up fairly quickly. Officially, this side of the navy modernization is chalked up to Taiwan. The ships are only needed to move soldiers and supplies for operations against the Taiwanese “separatists”. It shouldn’t take much mental power to realize that those ships will be just as capable of moving soldiers and supplies to other places.

Barring any disruptions from the Democrats gaining control of Congress, the US Navy is projected to grow from 123 ships and 52 subs to 161 ships and 50 subs. Due to our other global commitments it’ll be difficult to send more than half of our fleet to the western Pacific unless we wished to invite more trouble by reducing those commitments. Adding in the Japanese Navy, this would yield a force of approximately 100 ships and 40 subs today and 110 ships and 40 subs in 2015. Impressively larger that may be, but the ratio of ships will decline from 4:1 to 2.75:1 and of subs from 2:1 to 1:1. It has to be noted though that 22 of these new US ships are the smaller and less capable Littoral Combat Ships. Since the final design of the LCS hasn’t been determined yet, it’s difficult at this time to say if they would have much use against China. At the moment it would seem that they wouldn’t since they are mainly for operations in shallow waters against less capable countries like Iran or North Korea; but who knows until the design and procurement schedules are finalized. The effect of the US Navy’s 12 aircraft carriers is also somewhat difficult to gauge. On the one hand each has more theoretical firepower than just about any navy on the planet. On the other their anti-submarine capabilities are not proportional to their greater firepower and their prohibitive cost would likely cause them to see more limited usage than is normal (especially in light of the sub part). Exactly how much this would limit their tremendous firepower can only be known when the war happens.

Not to sound like a broken record, but the Chinese fleet is not going to be a force that can clear the oceans of US Navy ships anytime soon. The trouble is that it could still pose a major threat to the US Navy and the Pax Americana even in a smaller state. The problem is that the Chinese are not preparing for a stand up fight, and we would likely shirk from one anyways (their preferred result). Unlike Germany in their naval race, the Chinese understand that their sub force is their major threat. Admittedly, it will be much more difficult in war-time for a Chinese sub to get within 5 miles of a US carrier than it was last October. However, in less than a decade China will have at least 40 subs trying to do just that, not just one. The US Navy has been trying to develop new tactics to counter the new super-quiet conventional subs, but we of course don’t know if the Navy is having any success (a potentially hostile sub being able to shadow a carrier until the sub chose to reveal itself doesn't exactly inspire confidence).

These Chinese subs would be looking for one of the 4-8 carriers we send to the western Pacific. The more carriers we send does increase the odds of Chinese subs being found, but it would likely increase the odds of a carrier being sunk even more. With only a couple dozen each of subs and ships free the US Navy will be hard pressed to search the sea lanes across the breadth of the Pacific for them. Like the dreadnaughts of WWI, modern supercarriers are so prohibitively expensive and imbued with so much national pride that the loss of one would be a tremendous blow to America. Losing 2 or 3 would simply have unthinkable consequences to America’s position in the world.

The Chinese surface fleet would have its opportunities to do damage as well. While America’s carriers, along with around 30-50 escort ships, are desperately trying to avoid Chinese subs hundreds and maybe thousands of miles east of Taiwan, the surface ships of the Chinese navy would be well positioned for rapid sorties against smaller American/Japanese task forces. In this way they would play a role similar to Germany's Battlecruiser Squadron during WWI. The goal would be to sink enough American ships that we give up, regardless of how many ships and subs China loses. China also has various “assassins’ mace” weapons that they hope will be able to exploit weaknesses in the US Navy’s capabilities. These include weapons like lasers, anti-satellite devices, ballistic missiles capable of hitting a moving target, and so forth. What impact they would have is unknown. At the very least they would add to the US Navy’s worries and force the carriers to operate in an even more limited capacity. Most importantly is if the Chinese think these weapons will be tremendously effective. That’s all the more reason for them to create a situation where they could be.

However, this is not the scenario the Chinese wish to occur. Rather it is the scenario they hope America so fears that she won’t even dare to challenge them. Germany wagered in 1914 that Britain would rather keep her dreadnaughts and thus her empire than risk both to stop Germany’s goals in Europe, they were wrong. China is wagering that America would rather keep her supercarriers and maintain her position in the rest of the world than stop China’s moves in East Asia, I wish I could say they are wrong. However, the buckling of American resolve in Iraq under 3,000 dead in almost 4 years does not offer hope. How quickly will Americans be demanding and end to conflict and the return of cheap toys and kitchen appliances when 3,000 sailors go down with a carrier? America and Japan cannot rest easy even if the Chinese are not megalomaniacally willing to risk their small fleet by starting a war whose success depends on weak American resolve. Longer-term this initial fleet is providing China with industrial and military know-how that is necessary to build and operate a large fleet along with the experience they will require to actually fight the far more experienced US Navy. With their growing economy, ship building industry, and cadre of trained sailors, it would not be difficult for China to launch into a sudden massive shipbuilding program in the near future.

Either way, this is a development that should be closely watched and replied to by both the United States and Japan. Chinese protestations aside, it is not their declared intentions but their capabilities and our interests on which we must base our own policies. Aircraft carriers, underway replenishment ships, and vast numbers of modern conventional attack subs are not needed to conquer Taiwan, they are needed to fight the US and Japanese navies. At the least, they are preparing the capability to fight us, we must make sure we maintain and if need be expand ours.

Note: I consider a modern warship to be one with a) anti-aircraft capabilities beyond 10 miles, b) a close in weapons system to defend against missiles, c) either less than 20 years old or extensively upgraded in the last 20 years, d) capability in more than 2 areas (anti-air, anti-surface, anti-sub, and land attack). A semi-modern ship would be one that has at least 2 of the above. Subs are a little more difficult, but aside from the Chinese Han-class I consider the rest modern. The Han-class isn’t only because it’s a very noisy sub even by nuclear standards. The conventional subs show a clear break between older and modern designs in capability (as witnessed by the aforementioned Chinese Song-class exploit) so they are either counted or not.

A Lesson from History: Everyone Hates a Winner (unless they need him)

Early on in my independent study of history I noticed a trend in global power politics that I thought would be of concern for America’s future. What seemed to happen time and time again was that when a single nation would emerge indisputably victorious from a great conflict, most of the enemy and neutral nations would turn on this power while allies would remain neutral at the commencement of the next great conflict. Though it was only 1995 and we were in the middle of the halcyon days of the mid 90’s this indicated trouble ahead for America when she would inevitably be called back to fight (sorry, at the time I didn’t know what email was much less have a blog so I can’t reference this).

This trend is most notable in the wars of the European balance of power era starting around 1700. Prior to that, and in the first decades of the 19th and 20th Centuries, there was a single power in Europe so great that all the wars were focused on restraining this power (Spain first, then France, and lastly Germany). These wars (e.g. Nine Years War then War of the Spanish Succession, Wars of the various Coalitions, and World War I and II) were mostly repeats of the last war as far as alliances go.

With the War of the Spanish Succession and the introduction of a rough balance of power in Europe this changed. The war itself was fought by Britain, Holland, Austria, and various German and Italian states against France and Spain. This is the first war which left no one dominating power against which the rest of Europe could align. It was also the first war that left only a single true victor. When the war ended in 1714, Austria gained Spain’s possessions in Italy and the Mediterranean while the other belligerents received nothing for their trouble. This laid the groundwork for the resentment which would build and engulf Austria in 26 years.

Except for France, who fought a war against Austria in the 1730's, the other European powers waited like vultures for the day when Maria Theresa succeeded her father to the Hapsburg throne in Vienna. That day finally came in 1740 and they didn’t waste any time in taking advantage of the opportunity to grab some land. France, Bavaria, Saxony, Poland, and most importantly Prussia started the War of the Austrian Succession with dreams of partitioning the Austrian Empire. Only Britain, worried as always about maintaining the European balance of power supported Austria. However, Britain did so only with subsidies, colonial action, and threats. In the end, after 8 costly years of war, again only one power would see any gain. This time it was Prussia and its upstart king Frederick II who added the rich Austrian province of Silesia to his realm.

Frederick the Great was no fool and understood his fait after being the sole victor in 1748. As he expected, by 1756 Austria had formed an alliance with France, Russia, Poland, and the Holy Roman Empire. As before these powers planned to partition the rising Prussian state amongst themselves. Also like before Britain (along with Hannover) was Prussia’s sole ally after the Diplomatic Revolution. This time though they did field an army of British and German soldiers who fought against France in western Germany. Following the new tradition, there was a single winner after the Seven Years War, Great Britain. While all of the other belligerents gained nothing for their efforts, Britain annexed much of the French overseas empire following the war.

The lopsided British victory of 1763 was the straw that broke the camels back for most of Europe. Perfidious Albion hiding on her island behind the Royal Navy had always avoided the deprivations of war. The other Maritime states of Europe especially bided their time. Their moment came a scant 12 years later when the American Revolution broke out and threatened Britain’s grip on her most productive colony. Though it was understandable that France and to a lesser extent Spain would take such an opportunity, even the Dutch who had been protected by Britain for a century joined in. Prussia, the country that owed Britain the most and could do the most to draw off French resources, indirectly supported the colonists. Most of the rest of Europe would join the League of Armed Neutrality which limited Britain’s ability to fight in the colonies via economic means. Except for the loss of the American colonies, Britain would actually win against every belligerent and further expand her empire.

This is the last of the balance of power wars since shortly after the American Revolution came the French Revolution and a 23 year series of wars to restrain France. The mid 19th Century “diplomatic wars” do not fit as well within this framework since they were much more limited. To an extent it could be said that though every power except France benefited in 1815, Russia was one of the biggest benefactors. When she tried to gain further territory, the British, French, Sardinians, and Turks fought to prevent it in the Crimean War of 1854-56. After Prussia’s string of three triumphal victories over Hannover, Austria, and France Bismarck knew Europe would focus on Germany and it of course did. Again though, Germany quickly grew so great in power that it was no longer balance of power but stopping a country with the power to dominate Europe by itself. This required 2 world wars and the intervention of the United States to accomplish.

World War II ended with 5 countries claiming victory and major gains for two of them. This developed into a 50 year balance of power conflict that of course ended in 1990. At the conclusion of the Cold War there was but one victor, the United States. Russia was humiliated and driven back to the borders she held in the 1600’s. Japan and Europe both fell into the economic doldrums and saw their non-military based diplomacy shorn of its value. China gained little from the end of the Cold War. A Russian adversary and American ally flipped to an American adversary and Russian ally. It doesn’t take much brainpower to realize which was the better deal. Smaller countries all over the world lost the economic life support they had grown accustomed to during the Cold War Superpower courtship. Only America saw her position in the world irrefutably improved.

This I believed would be the core of the resentment for which we would have to watch out in the coming years (that is today). We have seen it manifest itself in many ways over the years. The obvious desire by Europe and others that the Euro destroy the dollar based trading system and they hope damage the US economy. The growing efforts by countries like China, Russia, France, Iran, and Brazil to replace our influence in their regions with their own. The UN and other transnational groups (like Kyoto) renewed attempts to redistribute our diplomatic, economic, and military power in the hopes of leveling the playing field for weaker countries. I think also that this has also shown itself in the difficulties we are having rousing the world to face down Islamic extremism. Except for our Anglo brethren and Japan, most of our allies today are those who need us to protect them from Russia, China, or the Islamists. This is much like Britain needed Austria and then Prussia to help fight France regardless of their sole victory.

The resentment in these challenges is palpable. As mentioned in a previous post, most people who oppose us only seem upset that we aren’t doing what they want or helping them directly. We could be spending a hundred billion dollars a year in Mexico Mexicans gripe, implementing the US economy devastating Kyoto Protocols Europeans grumble, overthrowing the Ayatollahs Iranians complain, lining the pockets of Kofi Annan and other UN staffers and friends the UN protests, or building fire stations in New York Democrats charge, etc. Nevertheless, the clear goal of all this is to drop us down a peg and allow others to divide up our power and influence. It is nothing new or exceptional and should not be surprising. It is however dishonorable, distressing, and for many countries counterproductive. Such is human nature, as it has always been, and as it will always be. Though we should hope for better out of humanity, we cannot expect and plan for anything else.

Learning Nothing and Forgetting Nothing, the Realist Foreign Policy Comes to Iraq

James Baker, co-chair of the Iraq Study Group, has, along with his group, called for negotiating with the Iranians over Iraq. The idea is that either the Iranians will talk and stop supporting the violence in Iraq, or they won’t show or stop supporting the chaos in Iraq and we will show the world that Iran is the problem. This is a standard argument made by the diplomacy always crowd. I’ve heard it too many times to count since I began paying attention to world politics a dozen years. It is tried time and time again despite one simple reality, it almost never works and offers the rogue nation the opportunity to constrain the power who initiated it.

The basic problem with this policy is that it assumes many things that are usually not true. Firstly it assumes that the offending country is interested in meeting and compromising on an issue. It next assumes that whatever countries are meant to be impressed by this display will actually be impressed and offer support after the offending nation rejects or refuses the advance. Essentially this means that these countries are willing and able to do something but are not doing anything merely because the offending nation has not been offered the chance to resolve the dispute diplomatically (the fact that the offending nation has not itself tried diplomacy doesn’t matter of course). Lastly it assumes that even should the offending nation show up and agree to stop its behavior for some carrots, that it will actually stop its behavior as it promises.

Due to its history of failure and its inaccurate understanding of the current situation we can fully expect such a policy to fail every bit as miserably today with Iran as it has in the past. Each of the above assumptions is wildly off in today’s standoff with Iran:

Iran wants a stable Iraq like the rest of us

This is only correct if you allow for Iran’s different definition of a “stable Iraq”. Sure they want it stable, under the Ayatollahs as a totalitarian Shiite government like Iran’s. This is obviously not what most of the world considers a “stable Iraq”. Iran is also damaging our geopolitical position and making it much more difficult for us to do anything about their nuclear program because of the continued violence. The violence is ensuring that no American government will initiate another preemptive war anytime soon. Thus it is in Iran’s long-term interests to see that things are as bad as possible as long as possible in Iraq to make sure this opinion reigns in the US for as long as possible. Why then would Iran help us form a stable Iraq that is in our interests and not their’s?

Europe, Russia, and China will finally accept the need to do something about Iran

Not likely. These powers do not support our efforts to stop Iran’s nuclear program and restoration of the Achaemenid Empire because they have no ability to do so and would lose too much in the process. Russia and China support Iran as part of their campaign to multi-polarize the world. Iran is working miracles for them in this regard so they are not going to support us no matter what. Europe will be no more capable of doing anything to stop Iran tomorrow as they are today. Except for the British (who aren’t in a position to help anyways), they have no projectable military power and won’t support sanctions since it would cost them business contracts with Iran. Iran imports almost $6 billion worth of goods from Germany, $3 billion from Italy, and $2.5 billion from France. None of those countries has seen much economic growth in the last 15 years, and none are willing to take an economic hit for us or the world. Europe further knows that if Iran does become a major threat, they can beg us to rescue them, and we’ll ride to their rescue as we have for the last 100 years. We are after all building missile defense sites to protect Europe from Iranian missiles free of charge in Poland.

Iran will accept a good offer and stop supporting the violence in Iraq

The first half of that statement is almost certainly true. If we offer Iran tribute to stop being bad they’d be idiots not to accept it. That doesn’t mean they will stop supporting violence. If we make a deal with them and they continue supporting the violence, then what? We have a deal with them Europe, China, and Russia will intone; we cannot risk wrecking the deal over such a trifle thing as Iran not living up to its end of the bargain. Rather than add impetus to the effort to stop Iran, all we will have done is pay off the Iranian government, give it credibility amongst the Iranian people, and further hamper any effort to head off the major storm coming down the road.

Even though a clear understanding of the situation and the interests of the powers involved would indicate the deal will not work and will only hurt us, there is also history to add to the argument against it. The Munich agreement would of course be the most glaring and devastating example of this. Hitler accepts a deal, doesn’t live up to it and everyone looks the other way. Israel has had countless similar deals with the Palestinians. Most notable was the Camp David Accords of 2000. Israel offered the Palestinians almost everything they want. Arafat not only walked away but soon after started the second intifada. Initially the diplomacy always crowd argued this was great for Israel since the Palestinians had shown that they were the true obstacles to peace. Despite this, world support for Israel lasted only as long as Israel did nothing about the suicide bombers attacking her civilians (that is to say a very short time indeed). I’m not even going to go through the 17 times we tried this with Saddam, including not once but twice prior to the 2003 invasion. Most relevant of all, what happened to world support for punishing Iran when it didn’t stop enriching uranium on August 31st? The idea was Iran would stop enriching or else. If they didn’t the world would supposedly see that Iran was the problem and support efforts to stop their nuclear program. Well, Iran didn’t stop and what was the world’s reaction?

Russia- said no to sanctions or any action; but they did regret Iran’s actions.
Europe- demanded…. more talks since 8 years is obviously to short a time to rush to impose visa sanctions on Iran’s leaders.
UN- nothing, not even a statement since it was the ambassador from Ghana’s last day, and as he told reporters, “give me a break.”

Why anyone believes the world’s reaction will be any different this time round is beyond me. Whether Iran simply refuses to talk or takes our tribute and continues supporting violence in Iraq, the result will be the same. Unless we accept, and accept soon, that Iraq does not exist in a vacuum, that our titular allies have neither the will nor the capability to do anything, and that Iran, Russia, and China have no interest in seeing us succeed in forming a stable mostly free/democratic Iraq, we will lose in Iraq and the price for us and the world will be incalculable. The realists’ motto appears to be, “Pounds for the cure tomorrow, not an ounce for prevention today”. However, guessing by last month's elections, it is how the American people want it, so it is how the world will get it.

I'd add liberal foreign policy in the title, but for liberals to have a foreign policy that learns nothing and forgets nothing, they'd, well, first have to have a foreign policy (and no, blaming America and Israel for everything, worshipping the UN, and extolling the virtues of oppressive anti-American Third World despots doesn't count as a foreign policy).

The Case for Rumsfeld

There is a debate (the favorable posts are too old and aren't online anymore, in short several contributors like Rumsfeld, con, con) at the National Review over the efficacy of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. I personally admire Rumsfeld very much as can be seen below. This post, Rumsfeld vs. the McClellan Democrats, from a month or so ago explains some of the reasons I like him. The following post is much older and explains why I think, contrary to some conservatives, that the current war makes transformation more imperative not less. Also, yes Rumsfeld wanted to eliminate two divisions prior to 9/11. Even under the first Bush budget, better though it was, the Army was simply not funded to a level required for 10 fully operational divisions. While the Defense Secretary must advocate for more, he also must plan based in reality (the Navy can have a plan for 33 carriers, it still isn't happening). Converting to an entirely light army would have been a mistake, and one I opposed at the time, but no one is perfect. Even so, it wouldn't have been too serious to this point, and it may have even been beneficial given the wars we fought. More light infantry would have been useful in Iraq in the first year and it was all we used in Afghanistan and elsewhere anyways. Nevertheless, it wasn't a good idea and Rumsfeld has dropped it. Anyways, on to the old post...

The 40,000 Soldier Question

Since 9/11 we have heard liberals frequently claim we need to add 40,000 more soldiers to the Army. It is treated by the left as a panacea for everything that ails the Army (whether true or not). Meanwhile, in the background Rumsfeld's transformation of the Army continues plodding along. Should we have added 40,000 soldiers? Or was allowing Rumsfeld's work to continue the better call? (It should be noted when discussing the reform of the Army that it is extremely difficult to find complete information on all aspects of it. I assume in cases where no information is available that it is staying similar to the current Army.)

First off, why reform at all? The reason is we still have a military which is essentially the little brother of the Cold War military. That military was designed to send dozens of divisions to fight the Soviet Union on the plains of Germany. Our current military is designed to send 3-6 divisions to fight regional wars against lesser states; Cold War planning in miniature. Further, the basic combat unit is still the division. This despite divisions almost never deploying for combat as they are organized in peacetime. The heavy battalions of the Army are still organized for the mass tank confrontation with the Soviet Union. Compared to the 18-24 armor battalions we had guarding the few dozen miles of the Fulda Gap in Germany during the Cold War we had 4 armor battalions sweeping the several hundred miles of desert in the invasion of Iraq. It no longer makes sense to have all tank battalions, as the ad hoc usage of mixed mechanized infantry (hereafter called mech) and armor task forces in Iraq shows. Lastly, the overall mix of troops we need has changed. In the past we needed lots of armor and artillery, now we need more infantry and military police.

Rumsfeld's reforms largely takes these issues that are being worked through on an ad hoc basis during combat operations and makes them permanent. On the issue of divisions, they are being made "modular". This means the brigades in the divisions can be easily switched around to suit the needs of the current mission. All of the support assets that used to be loaned from the division when it came time to deploy are now permanently part of the brigade. The heavy battalions are being changed from 3 mech or 3 armor companies to a mix of 2 mech and 2 armor companies. Many artillery and air defense battalions are being replaced with more useful military police and cavalry battalions. The net effect of these reforms is to increase the number of combat and close combat soldiers in the Army without increasing the overall number of soldiers. Basically, it is making the Army more efficient. The pre-Rumsfeld Army had approximately 59,000 combat and 61,000 near combat soldiers, or about 12.5% in each category. (note: my definition of combat soldiers is soldiers in infantry, armor, cavalry, and special forces units; close combat soldiers are those in artillery, air defense, engineer, and military police units. It does not conform to the Army's MOS classification system, nor do I include artillery as a combat unit.) Once Rumsfeld's transformation is completed with 48 new brigades, there will be 75,000 combat and 64,000 near combat soldiers. This would represent about 15.5% and 13.5% of the Army. While the overall number of combat soldiers per brigade would drop from 3,370 to 2,700, the total number of brigades that could be sustainably deployed would increase from 14 to 20. This means that the number of Army combat/near combat soldiers that could be deployed somewhere like Iraq would increase from 47,000 to 54,000 (the number of combat soldiers would see a much greater increase from 21,500 to 27,500).

The problem with only adding 40,000 soldiers is that it would just be adding more soldiers to the old Cold War Army. It would do nothing to solve various problems such as deployability, tactical rigidity, or exceptionally low share of combat soldiers of the old system. It is also more expensive than transformation while being less effective. Simply adding 40,000 soldiers to the Army would add 5,000 combat and 5,000 close combat soldiers. This compared to the net gains of 16,000 and 3,000 respectively with transformation. However, it would require an increase in the Army budget of nearly $6 billion a year plus many more billions upfront for the new equipment and buildings. Transformation costs a few hundred million for the more expensive training of the extra combat soldiers and such. While I support much more money for the Army, what matters is that Congress will not fund the extra $6 billion on a sustained basis. Congress has always cut funding quicker than troop levels.

The question would then arise, why not do both? Besides the fact that it is difficult enough just expanding the Army much less transforming it at the same time, the main reason is that the Pentagon as a whole does not want to reform to begin with. Armies have historically had major issues with reform and change. As great as our Army is, it is still an army. It has all the institutional problems that afflict all armies and nothing will ever change that. That said there are two things that spur change and reform in an army, defeat and fighting a war with limited means. To successfully change an army you must know how to operate within these constraints. Rumsfeld knows much better than most how to work within the Pentagon.

Examples of the first case include the German army after World War I and the French army after the Seven Years War. However, this situation will not force reform through today in the US Army so is not relevant. The second case can apply today and is what we are doing. When armies are provided with everything they ask for to fight a war, they will simply fight it the way they have always fought. The best (or worst if you like) example of this is World War I. Initially every army was given everything it could ask for, all the men, guns, and supplies they wanted. The result was the generals fought on like they always had. They did not attempt any reforms since they were constantly receiving new soldiers and supplies to try again. It was not until 1916 when her manpower reserves began to run low that Germany started to think about different, quicker ways to fight. England followed suit after Lloyd George refused to send more conscripts to France in the wake of the Paschendale Offensive. By early 1918 the Germans had developed the organization and tactics that allowed for infantry exploitations while the British had begun figuring out tank exploitations. It was the requirement to fight a war without all the resources they wanted that forced these armies to develop their new ideas. Sadly, that is how armies have always worked, and always will.

This is what we are doing today. The Army is having to figure out how to provide more combat troops to deal post-conflict occupations without simply recruiting extra soldiers. In the process it is possible to get through other reforms to deal with the outdated Cold War structure of our Army. The overall effect on Iraq is limited since as evidenced in my prior post I think we are at the point where adding more soldiers becomes counter-productive. However, it would be nice to either have more combat soldiers with the same number of soldiers overall, or the same number of combat soldiers with fewer soldiers overall. It is also good (though not necessary, we are at war) to lower the strain on the National Guard. Iraq is also a great opportunity for reform because while it is limiting opposition to transformation, we are not at major risk by reforming before adding more soldiers. By comparison, had the British military been slow to change in 1918, the decision to stop sending new soldiers could have easily cost them the war when the Germans unleashed their new tactics in March 1918.

Once transformation is complete we could add 40,000 soldiers and get even more combat soldiers. But until the Army reforms are completed, it is better to hold off lest it cause the generals to begin seriously opposing transformation because of their new found leverage. Since in addition to fixing many of the current structural problems in the Army, transformation will also provide more combat soldiers at much less cost it is the better bet anyways for alleviating any troop level or deployment related issues the Army has. Afterwards, if Congress would continue funding the new soldiers and not force the Army to reduce its important procurement and training budgets then it is a good idea to add more soldiers. I never have and never will oppose troop increases or increased funding for the Army in general, only when there is good reason to. The need to reform the Army is just such a reason.

US Army OrBat http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/bua-list.htm
US Army Budget http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/FY07/overview.pdf
Numbers of soldiers is arrived at by using the above OrBat with the TO&E in the latest version of the Steel Panthers computer game.

Et Tu, Britannia?

Ever since the end of the Cold War, it was obvious that due to the massive reductions in defense spending by NATO members few could operate along side us anymore. This progression can be seen in the three main conflicts since the end of the Cold War. In the Persian Gulf War of 1991, most of NATO was capable of at least sending a squadron of aircraft. By 1999’s Kosovo War most of NATO was no longer capable of operating with us but instead spent the war hanging back and stretching while we did the heavy lifting. In 2003, most of NATO’s militaries had become so out of shape that they were not even able to hang back and stretch while showing the flag.

The one exception to this decline was thought to be Great Britain. Even as old Europe fell by the wayside, we, including myself, thought at least our kinfolk in Britain could still work with us. The last two years in Iraq and Afghanistan has seriously called this assumption into question. This is in no part due to the bravery and professionalism of the British soldier, which is as high as it has always been. Unfortunately, the British government has not funded the British military as much as their soldiers’ dedication and skill merits. This is beginning to cause serious problems as the British military, like ours, needs to purchase the expensive equipment required for counter insurgency operations and to replace the aged Cold War stockpile that is being rapidly burned through in Iraq.

The British are in an especially bad situation regarding counter-insurgency equipment. 15 years of moderate under funding has left the British military a very capable conventional force (as witnessed in Kosovo and Iraq) but without enough modern COIN equipment for even a medium scale operation. We at least had the hundreds of helicopters, UAV’s, counter-battery radar, fast quiet armored vehicles (Strykers), precision weapons, etc. that are the stuff of counter-insurgency. We have had to buy far more than planned, but it wasn’t too expensive. The British would have to buy most of it new which simply hasn’t happened. Since the British government is evidently uninterested in providing more defense funding (billions for health care, not a penny for defense seems to be the reigning philosophy), they should have at least reworked their current questionable spending plans.

EU Referendum Blog has been following the failure of the British government to properly allocate defense monies for some time. Unlike us, Britain is no longer responsible for global security and can safely focus more on either conventional or COIN aspects of their military. I would argue that since the British will mostly be engaged in COIN that they should focus on that capability. However, London’s spending plans indicate an almost entire focus on conventional war even while their soldiers have been fighting insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan for 4 years now. Even then, to save money, the conventional weapons Britain is buying would be of very limited use in an actual war. EU Referendum has an exchange with the Minister of State for Defense over this very issue. For example, the British government is overpaying roughly $4 billion (compared to the excellent and combat proven US Aegis Destroyer) for Type 45 destroyers that have most of their functionality removed. That’s not to say anything about the army’s $20+ billion FRES armored vehicle program that won’t be useful for either conventional or COIN operations, or the Eurofighter, or countless other smaller pointless and/or overpriced programs.

While what little money the British military has is blown on largely useless programs whose only real purpose is to get Britain promoted to the European grown-ups table from the Euro-kiddie table to which France has relegated her, the troops in Iraq and Afghanistan go without. This is becoming a problem for us and is growing worse every month. Without the proper equipment, the British Army has been mostly confined to their barracks, only patrolling in heavily armed convoys. This post from EU Referendum is their latest about the problems in Iraq. Lacking proper vehicles, British soldiers are easy targets on patrol. Lacking proper equipment, British soldiers are easy targets in their barracks. The only options are to stand in place and die, or retreat. When the British retreat, the militias fill in the void as happened in Amarah recently. We now have a situation developing where southern Iraq is being overrun with militias. I would not find it surprising if southern Iraq is more violent than the notorious Sunni Triangle soon (don’t hear much about Anbar anymore, for a reason).

One thing British leadership at all levels can be criticized for was the smug arrogance they took into Iraq and Afghanistan. The general attitude was that the British, unlike those well meaning but clueless Americans, understand “hearts and minds”. The British have been at this for centuries, they know how the game is played. They didn’t wear helmets, ride around in heavily armored vehicles, and do everything to kill any insurgent or terrorist they came across like we foolishly did. What the British forgot though was that they used to be able to operate like that because of the way they dealt with troublemakers. Back in the days of Empire, the British strapped insurgents to cannons, buried British soldiers under a tomb of native skulls, put executed Muslims in coffins with pigs, almost annihilated the Zulu people for Isandlwana, placed the entire Boer population into concentration camps (akin to refuggee camps today) for years, etc. The natives knew the price of misbehavior and so needed little extra encouragement to behave. This allowed the British to easily maintain order with a modicum of sparingly funded military forces. I am not saying the British should do this today, but they should realize that neither can they conduct operations in the laid back manner like they did before.

Though it isn’t easy or cheap and we will never get credit for it, we are learning how to fight a counter insurgency in the most humane way possible. Hopefully, the British will follow suit. If they do not then I don’t think we have any other choice but to not include the British in anymore operations. I always thought it was a mistake relying on NATO so much to help out in Afghanistan. Most NATO militaries have wasted away to such a point that they are little more than glorified crossing guards that shouldn’t be expected to do more than direct traffic in Kabul. As it happened, some, like Norway, requested just that recently (combat forces being used for combat, my goodness, someone get the smelling salts before I feint). The problems in southern Afghanistan are also revealing the hollowness of most NATO forces.

The British are a great people, who produce superb soldiers, and have an excellent history (if we are only half as successful as the British were during their time at the top, the world can count itself very lucky). Despite a smaller stature they still have ability to be a major force for good in the world. We have been good and loyal allies to each other for a century now. Though we are fast approaching such a crossroads, I still pray it never comes to pass that we can no longer say "Non Angli, sed Amici".

I should add that when referring to NATO militaries or forces I do not mean the individual soldiers an officers but the orgranization itself. Like British soldiers, NATO soldiers deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan are excellent warriors. The Canadian, Spanish, Bulgarian, Polish, etc. soldiers give their best and have on most occasions held their ground while giving far far better than they got. However, with some notable exceptions (Special Forces and the 3rd PPLI Battalion for example), they simply do not receive anything like the funding, equipment, or training they need to conduct sustained offensive operations. They are also mostly bereft of the moral support from back home needed to sustain the casualties necessary to complete their missions.

Friendly fire then and now

I’m vacationing at the moment so this is just a short observation. After the Gulf War the media went crazy over the friendly fire rate. I was a preteen at the time but was already watching the news and Discovery Channel. As such I remember the reports and shows about the unbelievably high “blue on blue” incidents during the war (to think of what things were like before the internet and Fox News, *shudder*). Why, they were much higher than in World War II, Korea, or Vietnam. Countless time was spent analyzing why this was the case and what should be done to fix it. As I recall the most common conclusion was that war had become to video gamey. All the thermal displays and night vision had made it too difficult for soldiers to tell who was who.

Even at the time I thought this attempt by the media to disparage whatever aspect they could of our massive victory to be silly. I thought the high friendly fire rate was merely the result of the Iraqi soldiers not doing their jobs. Had they been more competent and actually stood and fought then the friendly fire share of killed would be much lower. Thankfully the Iraqis didn’t even though that meant the friendly fire share was higher than usual. There were other peculiarities about that war that would have caused higher friendly fire casualties, it was a large and extremely aggressive mobile campaign, fought in the open desert, and fought day and night for the first time.

I was reminded of this by this article on strategypage.com about the number of friendly fire incidents in Iraq. Out of 2,100 killed in action since March 2003, only 21 have been due to friendly fire or 1%. This war, like all wars, also has its difference with past wars. Many of the killed are the result of I.E.D.’s that don’t have gunfights associated with them, engagements are mostly smaller scale with little operational maneuver that results in units unknowingly bumping into each other, and the soldiers are not dealing with a furious 24 hour tempo. Given the choice, I would prefer 21 friendly fire dead representing an absurdly high 35% of soldiers killed in action rather than 1% even if it causes the media to look down on trigger happy G.I.'s.

Nevertheless, it does show that American soldiers do not have an obsession with killing anything that moves, including fellow Americans. Unfortunately, that notion has been hammered into the minds of many around the world by this point. It is also further evidence that the media does not like the military or report fairly or intelligently about it. The military wins a conventional campaign quickly and with low casualties and the media still finds something that looks bad when incorrectly analyzed and beats the military over the head with it. Now it is ignoring the historically low friendly fire rate, once its pet cause, and instead focuses on casualty rates that are below those of the Filipino Insurrection and Vietnam (5 per 1,000 soldier-years for the Philippines vs. 20 in Vietnam vs. 4 today). Lastly, it further shows how incompetent the media is that they couldn’t figure out something an 11 year old boy could; that the high friendly fire share of the Gulf War was nothing endemic and would unfortunately not be as high when we faced an enemy who fought.

Thoughts about a couple Muslim talking points

We kept hearing during the fighting in southern Lebanon about “disproportionate” Israeli action. Teeth were gnashed and hands were wrung by countless people over the fact that roughly 6 Arabs were dying for each Israeli. The Lebanese Prime Minister bemoaned what he said was the world valuing Israeli tears more than Lebanese blood. And so on it went. This was the same thing were heard regarding the Palestinians during their second intifada (where about 5 Arabs died for each Israeli). Yet, no one complains about the Arabs disproportionate prisoner swap demands. For one Israeli prisoner the Arabs routinely demand 400-1000 Arab prisoners. The same Arabs who decry what they say is counting an Arab as 1/6 an Israeli are counting their prisoners as 1/400 to 1/1000 an Israeli. It should also be noted that the Iranians have said trading 60 million Muslims for 6 million Jews is worth it since it is a loss of 6% of the world’s Muslims for 50% of its Jews. So the Arabs own Muslim brothers put the Muslim-Jew value at 1/10. For that matter, where are the complaints about the Alawis killing 20,000 at Hama for demanding democracy? Or when the Jordanians finally had enough of Palestinian terrorism and killed thousands, maybe tens of thousands, during Black September? Or are disproportionate responses only ok when it’s Goyim doing the killing? It would seem to me then that Israel is overvaluing Arabs by at least twofold and maybe as high as 170-fold based on the Muslims own view of their value.

Never mind that “proportionate” responses are never how a nation should respond. After Pearl Harbor we didn’t respond by bombing Kure Naval Base, killing exactly 2,400 Japanese, and then going home. We didn’t respond to the Lusitania sinking by demanding Imperial Germany load up a similar sized German vessel with 1,100 civilians so we could sink it. Nor was the Iranian response to Saddam’s limited invasion of Khuzestan province to invade a similar Iraqi province but to attempt to overthrow Saddam and occupy Iraq. In the world of geopolitics this is a non-issue.

This also touches on the similar Muslim talking point that the world in general and America in particular care a lot more about Israeli babies than Arab ones. Last I checked it wasn’t the Israelis but the Arabs who are sending their children on “martyrdom operations” and who are setting up rocket launchers and terrorist safe houses in places with lots of children about. Adding the Iranians to the mix again, it was they and not the Israelis who used their young boys by the hundreds of thousands as human mine clearers and machine gun fodder. Even if the Muslims are right about us caring more about Israeli babies than theirs (which I would disagree with that), the real questions are why do they expect others to care more about their children than they themselves do and why they don't care about either their babies or Israel's.

Next up is another frequent claim by various “moderate” Muslims that stereotyping Muslims as terrorists is angering them and producing more terrorists. So angry at being considered the prime source for suicide bombers, bus bombers, school kid murderers, and beheaders they are going to disabuse us of this notion by….producing more suicide bombers, bus bombers, school kid murderers, and beheaders. Well I don’t know about you, but I’m certainly disabused. However, to be fair to Muslims, I will fully agree we need to focus more attention on elderly Japanese women’s Mahjong groups the first time one carries out a grade school massacre or bus bombing. Also I should note that I have no problem with hardline approaches against other terrorists like the ETA and IRA (to the point that I think the British should have invaded Ireland in the 60’s or 70’s for allowing the IRA to operate there). The attention on Muslims has nothing to do with their religion (except inasmuch as it motivates their actions and therefore requires us to pay attention to them) and the sooner “moderate” Muslims accept that and help us battle a common enemy, the sooner we can stop worrying about Muslims as terrorists.

Rumsfeld Vs. The McClellan Democrats

I should start by saying that I’m a huge Rumsfeld fan. Have been ever since I read the Wall Street Journal editorial back in 2000 calling for his appointment and discussing his prior distinguished Pentagon stint (for example, as Defense Secretary under Ford he almost single-handily saved the cruise missile from arms limitation talks; that alone should earn him a statue in Washington). Of course I don’t agree with all of his policies, but even if I disagreed with most of them, his expert management of the children in the press corps alone is more than worth his tenure. We are seeing in recent days another reason why I’ve always been a Rummy fan. He has an ability of pointing out simple facts that while not directed at the left causes the lefties to reveal their true colors.
Rumsfeld has again laid bare the hollowness of the Dems strategy on the war. Rumsfeld calling our enemy “Fascists”, something most average Americans would not contest, and drawing parallels with others in history who chose to ignore the threat fascists pose has left the Dems with three options:

1. Agree our enemies are fascists, but say it’s not that big a deal and thereby play to their type as weak on national security,
2. Agree and propose a vigorous policy to defeat these fascists and thus lose their nutroots and any hope of electoral victory this election,
3. Decry such remarks against the good patriotic freedom loving wannabe American Revolutionary (pick one or more based on the war) Soviet, N. Korean, N. Vietnamese, Iraqi, Iranian, terrorist, (enemy in the next conflict) people we are wrongly fighting thus making the Dems look not only weak but also insane (this is the option they seem to be choosing, I guess so they are at least in good company with their base).

As the Dems realize they put their collective foot in their mouth again, they are beginning to lash out at Rumsfeld, Cheney, Bush, Rove and all those simpletons who keep tricking them into saying stupid things. Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid decided to respond with what liberals consider history, take their current policy preference, slap “history shows” in front of it, and presto; much easier than spending hours upon hours reading and understanding history you must agree. He brought up that favorite of lefty charges, that Rumsfeld had ignored “military experts when he rushed to war without enough troops” (the full press release is here). Only this time, Rumsfeld is alleged to have ignored history as well.

First off, the reason why this assertion is so ridiculous is that you cannot say history always shows you should always send more soldiers. Even a cursory study of history would reveal that this is dependant on the situation. So what the argument should be is history shows more soldiers were needed for reasons x, y, and z, which compares with historical outcomes a, b, and c. The second thing to note is that there are “military experts” who would advise against any chosen course of action. It is simply impossible to do something that does not contravene a “military expert” selected by your political opponents. My views on this charge are a bit light because I link to posts I wrote before about them that are far far more detailed.

The claim that Rumsfeld did not send as many soldiers as were needed is highly questionable at best. I know this is the core liberal claim against the policy in Iraq as they think it allows them to sound tough while also opposing the President’s policy. Yes, they do have generals on their side, although it must be noted that their two highest profile generals, Clark and Shinseki, ended their careers in ignominy (both had been prepped for it during the Clinton years, although in Shinseki’s case they had to wait until Bush was in office to execute it, no it had nothing to do with Iraq). I wrote a post, "Echoes of the Sicilian Expedition" about that telling historical analogy that shows why I think sending 300,000 soldiers would have caused many more problems for us than it solved (it’s a long post, too long to copy here but well worth a read I would say). Essentially, we needed enough soldiers to keep the Sunni revanchists from winning while we established a Shiite-Kurdish security force without sending so many soldiers that we caused the majority of Iraqis to believe that, as lefties in the West told them, we were there to colonize their country and steal their oil.

Added to this is the simple fact that the logistical situation in the region precluded invading with more than 80,000 soldiers that would build to 150,000 over 6-7 months. True it would have been better had Saudi Arabia and especially Turkey gone along, but that wasn’t Rumsfeld’s job. That was Powell’s job and he botched it horribly (some, including me, would add willingly). Granted, the Democrats apparently think Okinawa makes a suitable base of operations for the Persian Gulf, so I can understand why they don’t realize this but I’m discussing reality here. Also, there is the simple fact that our military is of a certain size and can only support so many soldiers on continuous deployment. The Dems will say aha, we support 40,000 extra soldiers. As I wrote in another post,"The 40,000 soldier question", that is not the best way to go and is opposed by the generals for several good reasons (i.e. the “military experts” the civilian leadership is supposed to obey, although that may only be when they support the Dems so maybe it’s ok to ignore them here; lefties?). Basically, our main problem is that we do not have enough combat soldiers and the ones we have are in the wrong fields (artillery instead of recon or military police and even Air Force bomb loader instead of Air Force light infantry). Correcting that should be the priority.

The Democrat position on these topics is just a modern updated version of the original Democrat war policy, the “McClellan Doctrine” of 1861. What the McClellan Doctrine calls for is massive overwhelming firepower to fight any enemy. The problem is that it requires such a preponderance of firepower that in practice it is impossible to ever achieve it. As Lincoln commented about McClellan (not an exact quote), I gave him 200,000 men and he asks for 500,000, if I gave him that he would ask for 1 million, if I gave him that he would ask for 2 million. It wasn’t until McClellan was sidelined that decisive, though non-overwhelming, force was utilized to accomplish something. What Lincoln and Rumsfeld understand that the McClellan Democrats then and now do not is that an army has to be used in a non-perfect situation because a perfect situation will never occur.

“No one who believes he has anything to gain from war will be deterred by fear” - Hermocrates of Syracuse

Hermocrates’ words are very important to remember as we consider what to do about Iran. The cable news networks are frequented by various former ambassadors, foreign policy “analysts”, and Mideast “experts” who call for cease fires, agreed frameworks, conferences, anything and everything to keep the jaw-jaw going and prevent war-war. The first thing to consider is that as even the ancient Greeks understood, when one nation (or leader as the case may be) wants a war, they (he) will get a war whether we like it or not.

The next thing to consider is what would Iran gain from a war with America and Israel? The answer is, of course, many things. The Islamic regime is intensely unpopular in Iran. Unlike many of the TV commentators, I don’t think it’s possible to know which way the Persian people will go in the event of a war. There are good arguments both ways, but Ahmadinejad probably believes they will come back to the regime in the event of a war. The first half of this article is a good summation of Ahmadinejad’s basic strategic beliefs. They boil down to Iran will reshape the Middle East into a new Islamic Achaemenid Empire, and either America will run away and accept this, or America will be fought and forced to accept it. Whatever happens in this world view, America will be laid low by Ahmadinejad the Great. War brings Ahmadinejad stability at home, empire abroad, and eternal glory. Who would let a trifle thing like war dissuade them?

Even when not including the messianic mission Ahmadinejad may believe he is on, there is more than enough to gain from war in his eyes to cause him to be unswayed by fear of what America may do. No amount of bluster or talks will stop Ahmadinejad from his appointed task. American threats are worth as much to him as Iranian promises are to us. He wants a war; nothing will keep him from getting it.

Israel's Caudine Forks moment

One of the main ideas of this blog is that the results of current decisions can be mostly known by comparing them to similar decisions and results from the past. If that is the case then what result can a decision by the Israeli government to halt its Lebanon operation have? There is one main historical example, Samnia’s decision at the Caudine Forks, and the example of Napoleon’s exile to Elba and the Versailles Treaty that back it up.

The Caudine Forks is a defile in the Central Italian section of the Apennine Mountains. In 321 BC, during the Second Samnite War between Rome and Samnia, the Samnites laid an ambush at the Caudine Forks. The Roman army marched into the defile only to find its exit barricaded. When they returned to the entrance they found it blocked by the Samnite army. At this point the Samnite leader didn’t know what to do so he contacted his father who told him to make peace with the Romans and let them go home unharmed. He didn’t find this satisfactory so he again asked his father what he should do. This time his father said to kill all the Romans. This was a bit unexpected given the first piece of advice and was also unacceptable. He summoned his father who explained that if he let the Romans go home in peace he would have made a friend in Rome and they wouldn’t have to fight again. If he killed all the Romans he would destroy Roman power so they wouldn’t have to fight again. The son chose the middle way, he disarmed and humiliated the Romans and sent them home. Angry and still with their strength, the Romans resumed the war 5 years later. They would ultimately destroy the Samnite peoples after a third war. The lesson was that trying to get the best of both worlds usually causes you to end up with the worst.

The next two examples reinforce the reality that the middle way is almost always the worse way. After defeating Napoleon in the 1813 campaign in Germany, the Coalition had a choice to make: destroy Bonapartism to its core, or leave it in charge of ante-bellum France. They tried the latter option but Napoleon thought it was ruse and refused to respond. That meant the only other option was to either kill or exile Bonaparte and to disband his army. The Coalition chose instead to give Napoleon the Italian Isle of Elba to rule and reduced but maintained his army while they created a humiliating peace treaty for France. Not surprisingly, the French and Napoleon were left angry and with a still formidable army waiting for its Emperor to lead it again. After victory in a nearly disastrous Waterloo campaign the Coalition did get it right the second time. Bonaparte was exiled to St. Helena in the South Atlantic, the army was disbanded, and France occupied. The end of World War I is also an example of this tendency to go halfway. After the German army surrendered to what it expected would be decent terms that reflected the situation on the battlefield, the Allies chose to instead pull a fast one on the Germans. They imposed a humiliating treaty that was in no way reflective of events on the ground and yet still left the mightiest nation in Europe the mightiest nation in Europe. All it did was leave German smarting for revenge and with the means to attain it.

Now were at a situation where the Israeli government is deciding whether to call off its offensive in Lebanon and accept a cease fire with Hezbollah. The Israelis have trapped Hezbollah. It made an incredibly stupid move and opened the door to Israel annihilating it. One difference in this case is there is no generous peace offer option with Hezbollah. If Hezbollah were surrounded at the Caudine Forks and the Samnites let them go home, that would only reinforce in Hezbollah’s eyes that Samnia is weak and needs to be destroyed. At any rate, any such possibilty is in the past now. Israel’s two decisions now are 1) go all the way and continue the offensive no matter how angry the Lebanese people get and destroy Hezbollah, 2) choose the middle way and stop it now after getting the Lebanese people angry and leave Hezbollah with the strength to come after Israel again, this time with the support of the Lebanese people. Whatever choice Olmert makes, the Lebanese people and Hezbollah are going to be angry at Israel (well double so in Hezbollah’s case if that’s possible). The difference is whether Olmert will leave the Lebanese people and Hezbollah the capacity to achieve their revenge. History shows time and time again that leaders mostly choose the middle way so it would not surprise me if Olmert does now. However, history also shows what will happen if he does.

No, No, No, No, No, No, ...

I need to stop banging my head on a wall long enough to write a post. This news story from the AP is, short of Israelis calling off their Lebanon offensive, the worst possible thing that could happen. Why on earth would Israel possibly consider letting Hezbollah survive? So they can get back to planning more attacks, receiving more and longer range rockets from Iran and Syria, and waiting for the most opportune time to hit Israel again (like after the Labor Party of Perez and Barak is in charge)? Oh of course, the Lebanese Army will have to deploy to the border according to the deal. I hope Olmert is planning on giving them free lawn chairs and lemonade so they can at least be comfortable while they watch Hezbollah launch rockets into Israel because that’s all they will be able to do.

If Israel calls off her offensive without destroying Hezbollah, there will be no stopping them in Lebanon. They would have taken on the mighty Israeli Defense Forces and won; a feat no one else in the world can lay claim to. What are the odds a typical Lebanese soldier will be willing to take on Hezbollah after that? What will happen to Hezbollah’s popularity in Lebanon after they defeat Israel (which is what not destroying Hezbollah will be)? How much higher will it go above that after Hezbollah rushes money and workers around to rebuild the destruction Israel is causing? We have seen how much more trouble Hamas is now that it’s the government of Gaza and not just a faction. How can Olmert expect that Hezbollah, after it rides its popularity and show of strength to dominance in Lebanon, will not become every bit as bigger a problem as Hamas has? This time the Israelis can deal with only Hezbollah, next time they will have to deal with all of Lebanon.

This is also very bad as regards the democracies’ ability to deal with foreign threats. Hezbollah isn’t even a possible future threat; they are a threat here and now to Israel. If Israel, the toughest of all the democracies, quits this quickly after a raid into her own territory kills 8 soldiers with 2 kidnapped, after one of her missile corvettes is hit by a missile, after hundreds of rockets rain down on her civilians, then this portends very bad things for the free world. The Jews are the canary in the mine shaft, and the canary is not is not predicting very good things for us right now. From history I know why free societies are like this, but still, why do we have to keep waiting for problems to require millions or tens of millions of deaths before we will deal with them? Aren't we smarter than that? I really hope this is just a deception campaign so the ground invasion gains some level of surprise, but just in case it isn't I'm going back to banging my head on a wall.

The Damascus-Tehran Axis loses the initiative

Iran and Syria have been quite active of late. The last two weeks have seen terror attacks, cities rocketed, missiles launched, soldiers kidnapped, and threats of fire and brimstone to any who give them so much as a wry look. However, things aren’t quite as bad as they seem. As can be expected from dictators, they’ve focused entirely on the weakness the democratic would is showing and are ignoring our considerably strength and their own considerable weakness. As such they have grossly overplayed their hand and given us the initiative. Whether we use it to our advantage or surrender it again like in 2003 is up to us.

The world’s current crop of dictators miscalculating like this is entirely historical. The most well known example of this is of course Nazi Germany prior to World War II. Hitler’s moves to scrap the Versailles Treaty, re-militarize the Rhineland, annex Austria, the Sudetenland, and Bohemia & Moravia were all gross overextensions that occurred due to the perception of weakness in France and Britain. Any one of them could have easily cost Hitler everything had France and/or Britain called him on a bluff. He would have lost any war at that time as the country and military were manifestly not prepared for to fight at that time. Even had he backed down without a war it would have destroyed the aura of invincibility that a dictator requires to remain in power. As everyone knows, the Allies didn’t call his bluff until it was too late.

An example of this tendency where the bluff was called is the world wide advances by the Soviet Union following the fall of Saigon. The Soviets not unsurprisingly sensed weakness in America after we abandoned an ally and for some unfathomable reason elected Jimmy Carter President. The Soviets expanded their influence into host of countries and regions, Ethiopia, Somalia, Lusiphone Africa, Central America, the Philippines, and Afghanistan. They established major naval bases at Camranh Bay in Vietnam and Beriberi in Somalia which, properly used, would have greatly complicated matters for the U.S. Navy. Jimmy Carter and his foreign policy team suffered from the notion that America was in terminal decline, the Communists could never be defeated, and that it was better to just let the Soviets expand than to try to stop them. Ronald Reagan was under no such illusion and fully understood that the Soviets had overreached. They had apparently come to believe Carter’s world view of a weak America and strong U.S.S.R. It was not long before Reagan disabused them of such beliefs. By the end of the 1980’s, the Soviets broke under the strain of trying to match America’s arms buildup while supporting their old Communist satellite regimes, and their new ones in Central America, Africa, and Afghanistan against America’s counter-pressure. The Soviets were forced to abandon the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, their bases in Grenada, Beriberi, and Camranh Bay, their puppet government in Kabul, their Eastern European satellites and lastly the Soviet Union. As a dictatorship, they couldn't survive the weakness we forced them to display by standing up to them.

We are facing the same situation today with Iran and Syria. The weakness and hesitation we have shown since the summer of 2003 is driving their present actions. Since that time our one good move has been to run Syria out of Lebanon following their assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister. Otherwise, we have done nothing of substance regarding Iran and Syria’s support of Iraqi insurgents and terrorists, Iran’s clear desire for a nuclear bomb, Iran and Syria’s support of Hezbollah and Hamas, etc. The Iranians have badly misstepped by having Hezbollah attack Israel at this time. Its not exactly apparent at the moment what the Iranians were hoping to gain by Hezbollah attacking Israel. Whatever it is (trying to distract Israel so they don't hit Iran's nuclear program would be my best guess), since Israel isn't responding in the typical meek manner of a Western democracy it is backfiring on Iran and Syria. It has given the Israelis a golden opportunity to deal with Hezbollah and remove that annoyance from their strategic calculations. Without the Syrians in Lebanon the Israelis can destroy Hezbollah without worry of regional war. It’ll take at most a matter of weeks and a major problem for Israel can be rectified. With the destruction of Hezbollah, Lebanon will finally be cleared and the Lebanese can start rebuilding their country (if they choose to). Syria and Iran will both take an enormous prestige hit for not being able to save their terrorist proxy in Lebanon from Israel. This can be used to our advantage to put pressure on the regimes themselves hopefully bringing them down peacefully. As with Hitler both dictators have large factions within their countries who are not quite as interested in risking all by challenging America and Israel. Or failing that we can use it to spark a war after the Hamas/Hezbollah threat is eliminated. It is better to have it when they are not prepared for one and before they have nukes. Or we can continue out current policy of "Please sir, I'd like some more" responses to Iran's provocations. Meanwhile, the opportunity we have within our grasp will slip away.

However we respond, we must remember that we are running out of time to deal with the Iranians before they are nuclear armed. Our present options are to do nothing (what were doing at the moment), fight a war only after they’ve gone “too far” and we must, or fight an early war before they have nukes. The first option will lead to a certain future of nuclear protected Iranian terrorism and oil price extortion with the possibility of a nuclear exchange wiping out the Middle East (to people worried about what effect any action we take will have on oil prices I ask, what do you think oil prices will be after Israel exercises her “Samson Option” and nukes the entire Mideast?). The second option will lead to an unbelievably destructive war with an almost definite nuclear exchange. The third option will lead to a war and higher oil prices but with next to no possibility of a nuclear exchange. So to recap, the outcomes of our choices include 1) nuclear exchange, 2) nuclear exchange, 3) no nuclear exchange. As bad as option 3 is, it’s the best of the lot. The choice is ours, will we allow Ahmadinejad to run a replay of Hitler’s Germany, become a modern day nuclear armed Barbary Pirate, or will we break him like we did Andropov’s Russia? Just because Ahmadinejad seems to believe the John Kerry, Nancy Pelosi, Howard Dean, Harry Reid, et al world view of a weak money-obsessed America cowed by the bluster of a petty dictator and a few cents extra for a gallon of gas doesn’t mean its any truer than when Jimmy Carter was serving the same kool-aid in the 70’s. We didn't drink it then, we shouldn't today.

It takes one to Tango

The events of the last week highlight the fact that it only takes one side to have a war. Some in the democratic world (you can guess who) would disagree with that concept. They like to think that if we just don’t fight back, there will be no war. Or, as they would put it, if we refuse to contribute to the “cycle of violence” there will be no cycle and therefore no violence (according to this view the Arabs, Pakistanis, and other Muslims are not smart enough to act; they can only mindlessly react). However, the bus bombings in India and the terrorist raids on Israel are the latest example of what happens when one side believes it is at war and the other does not.

Israel thought that by withdrawing its settlers and army from Gaza and building a wall it could keep the Palestinians from attacking Israelis. The idea was the Israelis don’t want a war so if they just separate from the Palestinians and don’t fight them, there won’t be a war. The problem is the Palestinians don’t agree with that proposition. Hamas wants Israel out of Israel, not just out of the Gaza strip. Not surprisingly they continued to fight Israel after the pullback. Far from destroying the terrorists’ legitimacy amongst the population, the terrorists were elected to run the Gaza government after the pullout. In addition to giving them control of the government, the Israeli pullout also gave the terrorists the time, freedom, and safety they needed to prepare spectacular attacks on Israel. They are also able to build more, bigger, and better rockets to launch into Israel. It seems that only now the Israelis are beginning to realize that since the Palestinians are spoiling for a fight there will be attacks on Israel regardless of Israel’s actions (well to clarify, the right always realized that, the middle is coming to realize it, and the left will never realize it). The situation with Hezbollah and Lebanon is a little different but close enough. Replace Hamas with Hezbollah and Gaza with Lebanon and you’ve corrected most of the differences.

India is similarly rediscovering that the terrorists will kill them whether the Indians are actively fighting them or not. Their predicament is very similar to Israel’s with Lebanon only on a far larger and nuclear scale. The train bombings occurred despite India’s recent rapprochement with Pakistan (opening rail links, border crossing, cricket games and such). Ties were largely severed following the attack on the Indian Parliament back in December 2001 by 5 Pakistani terrorists. Whether it is the Pakistani government, the military, or the Inter-Services Intelligence that is working with anti-Indian terror groups, these attacks are aided by someone in Pakistan. Whoever it is, they are doing this after a period during which the Indians have attacked Pakistan’s Parliament exactly 0 times, and never blew up any rush hour trains in Karachi.

Whichever way the Israelis and Indians decide to respond, the simple reality is that even choosing to do nothing will not end the violence. Thus far doing nothing has resulted in 14 Israeli soldiers being killed inside their own country in a single week (like 700 American soldiers being killed in a week by Mexican drug gangs along the southern border) and unprecedented numbers of rockets being launched ever deeper into Israel proper. In India doing nothing didn’t stop over 200 innocent civilians from being murdered while traveling home during rush hour. These are just two of the many countries finding themselves being attacked by Islamic radicals trying to enforce Islam’s “Brezhnev Doctrine”, once Dar es-Islam, always Dar es-Islam. They will face attacks until they either submit to Islamic rule, or forcefully persuade the terrorists’ Muslim supporters to stop supporting such attacks.

There are so many examples of this argument and its results just in the 20th Century that it would be impossible to list them all. Some of the bigger ones are France and Britain believing that Hitler could be talked out of his war, and Jimmy Carter thinking that detente would lead to a more peaceful U.S.S.R. The most related is our own “Phony War” with the terrorists during the 1990’s. Some, like myself, thought that 9/11 showed once and for all that being nice and pretending you’re not at war with someone who is at war with you does not work. You can pretend the terrorists are being, in Clinton’s Secretary of Defense’s words, “not sufficiently provocative enough”, and one morning you wake up to a couple of your nation's biggest and most iconic buildings being reduced to rubble. We can only hope the Israelis and Indians will learn from our mistake and not let this violence continue unanswered until a catastrophe of that scale hits them.

Whether in a League or United, it's the Nations that matter

I apologize in advance for the length of this post

Most people should be at least familiar with the events that led to the demise of the League of Nations in the 1930’s. As a refresher, the League failed to stop the Japanese from occupying Manchuria in 1931 then invading China in 1937, the Italians from absorbing Abyssinia in 1935, Franco’s Nationalists from rebelling and seizing control in Spain in 1936, and the Germans from forming their Groess Deutschland in 1939. There are two common explanations for why the League proved unable to stop these aggressions. The first theory says that the League had no real enforcement powers. Since the League could not pass any binding agreements, the aggressors need not stop and no one need stop them. The second theory (the one I learned in grade school) is that isolationist Republicans killed U.S. participation in the League and without the U.S. it was unable to properly function.

Both of these theories miss one important factor, that despite what the United Nations thinks of itself, international organizations are nothing in and of themselves. All such organizations are a conglomeration of different nations who have different interests and different abilities. Regardless of its structure, no international organization can do more than its most powerful members are willing or capable of doing, and no such organization can command more authority than its most powerful members are willing to give it. Simply adding more unwilling nations or establishing rules they supposedly must “obey” does not change this fact.

In the League’s case, its most powerful members were clearly France and Britain. Despite post-war protestations of impotence, they were more than capable of dealing the rise of the dictators had they wanted to. At the end of 1930’s the British and French economies were in the neighborhood of $55 billion, Japan’s was around $6 billion, Italy’s $10 billion, and Germany’s $30 billion (Britain, France, and Italy saw little growth during the decade while the German and Japanese economies roughly doubled). So from an economic standpoint, France and Britain were twice as big as the three dictatorships in 1930 and still around 20% bigger just before the war. Further, the French and British were largely self-sufficient in raw materials due to their large empires. The few resources they didn’t possess, like Turkish chrome, they could easily purchase with their large currency and gold reserves.

In 1930, the year before the Manchurian Incident, The Japanese spent about $380 million on defense. The French and British spent a combined $1,750 million on their militaries. In 1934, the year before the Abyssinian Crises, the Italians spent $730 million on defense. The French and British spent around $2,430 million that year. Though the Germans surpassed the British and French military spending totals in 1935, it must be remembered that Germany was rearming from a terribly weak position. In 1932 the German military had 7 weak divisions, 6 small and 6 large cruisers, no heavy artillery, no tanks, no aircraft, and no submarines. Even by 1936 this had merely expanded to 36 weak divisions, the same navy, little heavy artillery, a few tiny tanks, a handful of aircraft, and a smattering of experimental submarines. The British and French at both times had some 90 active and reserve divisions available for Europe, all fully equipped with heavy artillery, thousands of modern tanks, and with thousands of aircraft to support them. Either navy could sortie a dozen squadrons as powerful as the entire Germany navy. Even as late as the Fall of France in June 1940, the Allies fielded 116 divisions vs. 148 German divisions (though many were recently raised infantry divisions of poor quality), more and better tanks (2,700 vs. 2,400 of which half were no match for the allied tanks), and a far greater force of 14,000 artillery pieces vs. 7,400 for the Germans. The only advantage at that point for the Germans was the superiority of the Luftwaffe with its 5,400 planes matched against 3,100 Allied aircraft.

Another area of weakness for the dictators that France and Britain were perfectly capable of exploiting was their isolation. All three were by themselves in their areas of conflict. Germany was alone in Central Europe, Italy alone in the Mediterranean, and Japan the most isolated of them in East Asia. They were further isolated in time, with Japan acting 3 years before Italy who acted 3 years before Germany. Until 1939 it was possible to deal with each of these nations separately and primarily with naval forces. Each was heavily dependant on imports of raw materials to keep their economies humming. None of them was capable of resisting the might of the Royal Navy much less the combined might of the Royal and French Navies. This was not unknown to the British military. The Royal Navy told the civilian government after World War II has started that in its estimation it was preferable that Italy stay neutral, but should she enter the war it was better she do so as a German ally.

Clearly then, at no time were the allies limited by economic, military, or strategic factors. Ergo, the League was not limited by any of those factors. What limited the British and French, and thus the League, was the moral factor. The French and British did not have the stomach for another war less than 20 years after the First World War. This was a time when appeasement had a positive connotation. It meant you were smart and negotiated with the dictators, giving a little to prevent another bloody war. During the 1930’s the French were living through the “hollow class” years when conscription fell due to the loss births during World War I. Though it didn’t seriously inhibit French military power, it was an all too living reminder of the price of war. The British, meanwhile, were all-consumed with the mundane administration and protection of empire. Risking a naval and colonial war in Africa and East Asia, no matter how much the odds favored the British, was out of the question.

These are all valid reasons to avoid war and they answer the question of why the League didn’t do much of anything to stop the dictators. Its greatest powers, though they had the capability, were simply exhausted and didn’t have the will to do anything. Since an international organization’s only power to enforce its authority is by the use of its members’ power, no nation had to respect its requests. The inclusion of a disarmed, isolationist, and even more unwilling United States would not have magically made the League any more capable of handling these problems. A dictator does not abide by a document simply because of how many signatures are on it; rather he does so because of how many warships, soldiers, and bombs that will visit him if he doesn’t. Had Britain and France been willing to act, they could have used the League as a sort of cover body and thereby made it a legitimate force to be reckoned with in international affairs. It was because they were unwilling to act, and not because of the League’s structure or make up, that the League was incapable of dealing with the problems of the 1930’s and eventually ended its disbandment.

The United Nations pretends to be better, but it is little different. Though it is technically organized on a more permanent and legal basis, its authority also only runs as far as its members are willing to enforce it. For much of its history the U.N. was merely a stage for Cold War posturing between America and Russia. Because of our respective vetoes, neither side had to worry about the U.N. doing anything against its interests. The only times the U.N.’s will has been enforced were in 1950 with the Korean War when we took advantage of a short Soviet boycott to essentially have the U.N. rubber stamp our decision to save South Korea (at the time China’s veto was wielded by Taiwan), in 1991 when Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was something that clearly threatened the interests of all five permanent Security Council members, and in 2003 when the United States and Britain dragged the U.N. kicking and screaming behind us as we enforced the Security Council’s many Iraq resolutions. At no time has the U.N. ever acted on its own nor has it at any time fixed a problem without it being A) in the interest of a major power, and B) not in the interest of any major power to prevent.

The life of the United Nations has only been prolonged by its usefulness to both sides in the Cold War, the vetoes allowing the major powers to see that their interests are never actively threatened by the U.N., and the need for something to fill some of the functions of this organization. However, as we are seeing today its ability to do anything is severely limited for all the same reasons that the League was. On Iraq, Iran, and North Korea the United Nations can come to no consensus. Only with Iraq did we try to force the organization to live up to its purpose and I seriously doubt we will ever go through that again. With Iran and North Korea there is no great demand in the West for more wars to deal with those problems. When combined with the desire of two of the veto powers to see both those countries continue acting as a thorn in the side of the West it means there is no chance of the U.N. resolving either problem on its own. The only reason either nation has to listen to the demands of the United Nations is because America and Europe will use their power to make them listen. Since we are not likely to start a war with North Korea and since Iran is led by the left and media in the West to believe that we won’t go to war, there is no chance of either abiding by any agreements; despite the U.N. letterhead. We are the only country in the world with the power to act, so long as we go through the U.N. and trust it to do what’s best for the world we will not be able to.

The belief of some Americans (primarily on the left) that the U.N. can alone solve the world’s problems is also problematic. Should the American people ever agree and give such people political power, it will be similar to the 1930’s with the left in Britain and France believing in an international organization whose only power is there own, and in signed documents with dictators who have no desire and no need to observe them. After all, they will say Ahmedinejad is a man we can deal with. In 2010, should Hilary Clinton hold in her hand a piece of paper with his signature on it for the world to see, we will have peace for our time and we can finally all go home and get a nice quiet sleep. Only leftists and fools won't realize what will await us in the morning.

All facts and figures are from Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers and J.F.C. Fuller's A Military History of the Western World: Volume III, both excellent books.