Israel Offers Many Important Lessons, We Should Pay Attention

Strategypage.com has a story about how Israeli tanks performed against Hezbollah last summer in Lebanon. That the Israeli tanks generally performed well despite a few hiccups is as I expected at the time (and can be seen in my July/August posts about the conflict), and isn’t really anything noteworthy. However, I think this story conveniently ties together three other common themes of this blog along with an important point. The first is the conversion of Western media outlets into propaganda way stations for the Islamists. The next is the importance of properly funding militaries so they can deal with both counter-insurgency and conventional operations. The third theme is the importance of learning from history, even very recent history, and other countries. Lastly, this further reinforces the fact that the tank is far from dead on the modern battlefield.

From the beginning of this war the media has to at least some extent been a propaganda organ for the Islamists. Even prior to the Afghan invasion we were fed a constant series of stories about the “Graveyard of Empires”, the “Invincible Afghan Super-Tribesman”, the “Ferocious Afghan Winter”, etc (all of which is highly inaccurate by the way). The media could contain its collective glee for all of three weeks before jumping to label the operation a “quagmire”. It is not then unexpected that the media leapt at the opportunity to do some cheerleading for the Islamists last summer. Hardly a news story was written that didn’t include some item about Hezbollah “gutting” the Israeli Defense Force or “unexpected/exceptional Hezbollah resistance”. We have a media today that takes the Islamist line about Hezbollah supermen who with their novel tactics and wonder missiles were destroying the IDF and runs with it without bothering with such a trifle thing as checking its veracity. Now it is becoming clearer as many like myself said last summer that Israeli thrashed Hezbollah militarily. As I pointed out in a post, despite Hezbollah having better training and weapons than past Arab opponents, excellent fortified defensive terrain, and a hamstrung IDF that wasn’t as ready as it should have been, Hezbollah still did no better than past Arab armies. During World War II the media did not fall for the similar German propaganda about the “Nazi Supermen” or with “Nazi Wonder Weapons”. The media ignored it even though it was technically correct if inflated. Many divisions of the Waffen-SS, along with some regular army divisions (the Paras, Groess Deutschland, Panzer Lehr, etc.) were a head and shoulders above any allied division in capability. Germany also had superior weapons in many areas like Panther and Tiger tanks, Me-262 jet fighter, V-2 rockets, SG-44 assault rifles and so on. Somehow the media managed to resist propagandizing this to the home front for the Nazis. Our media by comparison cannot muster the same strength (I know it takes a lot) to ignore the flat-out false propaganda of the enemy. Had the World War II media fallen for Nazi propaganda it would have been a tragedy, but the media falling for Islamist propaganda is simply a farce; one we could well do without.

Another problem this report reveals is what happens when a military is forced to fight a long counter-insurgency operation without a requisite increase in defense spending. Many of Israel's problems can be traced to the IDF simply being unfit for conventional operations due to years of reduced funding for training. Tank crews were utilized as security soldiers for Palestinian areas and thus were not riding around practicing in their tanks. According to the CIA World Factbooks, from 1999 (prior to the second intifadah) to 2003 Israeli military spending declined from 9.4% to 8.75% of GDP despite increased military operations. Between 2003 and 2005, as the intifadah was largely suppressed, defense spending declined much more rapidly from 8.75% to 7.7%. A shrinking defense share of the economy, increased operational tempo, and a focus on counter-insurgency combined to create a situation where the Israelis were not as ready as they should have been for Hezbollah’s challenge. The price for that was paid last summer, is being paid in the large increases now required in defense spending, and will be paid when a revamped Hezbollah returns (possibly controlling Lebanon). A further lesson being taught is that when you elect a leftist to run your country they will not take national security seriously. The rank military incompetence displayed during the actual fighting by Israeli Prime Minister Olmert is continuing after the war. Despite the obvious need to increase the defense budget following last summer's war, Olmert has decided against properly funding the IDF. The soldiers dying to keep Israel safe and free won’t get the extra money they need but the education colleges have had their cuts reduced (note how protective the Labor MK is over education spending, if only they were as concerned with mending the damage low budgets have done to the IDF). Despite claims by the leftist politicians that they take defense issues seriously, when it comes to defense or social spending they will always go for the latter regardless the situation.

A favorite theme of mine is the importance of learning from historical and current mistakes of other countries. Otto von Bismarck made one of my favorite quotes regarding this, “fools learn from their own mistakes, I learn from others’ mistakes.” It’s not like we haven’t ignored Israeli's dearly paid for lessons before. Prior to the Iraq war, if I recall correctly, Israeli officers went to the Pentagon to teach us what they learned about modern counter-insurgency operations. I had expected this since Israel had mountains of information to share and we would need it in post-war Iraq. The program was ended and we didn’t adopt any of Israel's tactics in Iraq since as one of Fox News’ rent-a-generals so astutely counseled, "we’ll rightly ignore the Israelis, we don’t want to turn Iraq into the West Bank" (I paraphrase). A year and a half and scores of dead Americans later we were rushing to learn about the use of armored bulldozers, shoulder fired rockets, house clearing techniques and so forth from Israel. We improved these tactics and used them to great effect in cities like Fallujah, Ramadi, and Tal Afar (the Israelis repaid the favor and didn’t pay attention to our lessons when they attacked Bent Jbail). This story is a very important one indeed for Americans as the Democrat Congress races to repeat Israel’s mistake regarding defense spending. As of right now the military is managing somewhat to pay for both counter-insurgency operations while also maintaining its conventional war fighting capacity. There is a debate brewing over the need to fund both counter-insurgency and conventional capabilities at this time (here's an example, and my view regarding the Air Force at least). The argument for the Israeli-style policy is that the only fighting at the moment is counter-insurgency so that’s all we need to worry about. The fact that we won’t always be fighting counter-insurgencies and that the money being pledged today will take effect years from now when the world situation may be different are disregarded. The Democrats will likely find the billions they could free up for domestic spending by eliminating conventional weapons programs and training too appealing to pass up (my pre-election concern can be seen here). Like Israel, we will find it easier to do this for many years. Also like Israel the price of this policy will far outweigh the benefits and will have to be paid eventually.

My last point is a small one and is only generally related to the others. We have seen yet again that the tank still has a vital role on the modern battlefield. Relearning this is nothing new as the tank has been discounted since its inception in 1916. Part of the reason France and Britain did not focus on tank warfare prior to WWII was because they had learned the wrong lesson from the Spanish Civil War, that the tank was very limited since it could easily be destroyed by anti-tank guns. Then the light tank-destroyer was supposed to kill the tank, then the anti-tank guided missile, and then more advanced anti-tank missiles. Various advanced militaries around the world have at various times proposed getting rid of tanks. The US military did under Gen. Eric Shinseki and then briefly under Rumsfeld. The Canadian military tried at one point to get rid of its few tank units. Britain is presently on a Shinseki-style craze to transform her army into a hi-tech medium weight peacekeeping force without tanks. Even Israel has been reducing her tank fleet for some time. With the exception of Britain, each country has learned through combat operations that the tank is still very valuable. It is true that we have to watch that we don’t allow generals and politicians to hold onto their relics from prior wars, but we also have to see that they don’t get rid of valuable weapons because they incorrectly view them as “relics”.

The Foreseeable Unforeseen in Lebanon

What a shocking and unexpected turn of events in Lebanon. Riding high on their “victory” over the invincible Israelis, Hezbollah and its masters in Iran and Syria are now pushing a coup of sorts against the current anti-Tehran/Damascus government. I know, I know, who could have possibly anticipated this. Israel, America, Europe, and the UN all seemed to think that Hezbollah would be so grateful for Israel not destroying them that they would happily focus on their supposed charities and making the trains run on time in Beirut and stop their Iran backed campaign to kill Jews while spreading Shia extremism. It was clearly impossible to predict that a violent terrorist organization supported by a country seeking to make the world safe for the 12th Imam would follow-up a victory over the “Little Satan” by seeking a victory over what they consider the puppet government of the “Great Satan”.

Of course it was painfully obvious last summer that this would be the result of Israel not completing her mission in southern Lebanon. Also so apparent a kindergartner could have figured it out was that Hezbollah would receive lots of cash from Tehran after the fighting and would be helping the southern Lebanese before the bureaucrats at the US State Department and the UN had even signed the forms to schedule the meeting to arrange the conference to discuss sending aid. I’m not even going to start on how insane it was to think that a UN force supporting the Lebanese army was going to stop Hezbollah(4th paragraph) from rearming or operating in southern Lebanon. That no one in the foreign ministries of the West understood this is a sad testament to our inability in the West to understand the people and events that are making the world of our future.

To say that this is why Israel shouldn’t have fought Hezbollah to begin with is also terribly inaccurate. The only thing that boosts ones image more than a bloody victory is a bloodless one (think if France and Britain had fought over but ultimately acquiesced to Hitler’s Anschluss and re-occupying the Rheinland, sure Hitler’s stature would have been boosted but would the German people and army been as accepting of the Munich, Prague, Memel, and Polish Corridor gambles?). At least Lebanon is now aware of what Hezbollah brings to their future. Had Israel not fought, Hezbollah would have come off looking much more powerful (so powerful even the Israelis fear them) and it would have appeared that Hezbollah can deliver victories for Lebanon that the US backed government cannot. The reasoning in Lebanon would have been, why spark a civil war when Israel won’t do anything. Now they at least know if they don’t start a civil war to stop Hezbollah, the Israelis will return. Further, Hezbollah and Iran cannot simply be negotiated out of bellicosity by the Israelis. They want Israel exterminated and are willing to fight to achieve it. Whether Israel and the West like it or not, they will get their fight eventually. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, we can choose war or dishonor, if we choose dishonor we will get both. It’s well past time that we in the West wake up to this reality.

Thoughts about a couple Muslim talking points

We kept hearing during the fighting in southern Lebanon about “disproportionate” Israeli action. Teeth were gnashed and hands were wrung by countless people over the fact that roughly 6 Arabs were dying for each Israeli. The Lebanese Prime Minister bemoaned what he said was the world valuing Israeli tears more than Lebanese blood. And so on it went. This was the same thing were heard regarding the Palestinians during their second intifada (where about 5 Arabs died for each Israeli). Yet, no one complains about the Arabs disproportionate prisoner swap demands. For one Israeli prisoner the Arabs routinely demand 400-1000 Arab prisoners. The same Arabs who decry what they say is counting an Arab as 1/6 an Israeli are counting their prisoners as 1/400 to 1/1000 an Israeli. It should also be noted that the Iranians have said trading 60 million Muslims for 6 million Jews is worth it since it is a loss of 6% of the world’s Muslims for 50% of its Jews. So the Arabs own Muslim brothers put the Muslim-Jew value at 1/10. For that matter, where are the complaints about the Alawis killing 20,000 at Hama for demanding democracy? Or when the Jordanians finally had enough of Palestinian terrorism and killed thousands, maybe tens of thousands, during Black September? Or are disproportionate responses only ok when it’s Goyim doing the killing? It would seem to me then that Israel is overvaluing Arabs by at least twofold and maybe as high as 170-fold based on the Muslims own view of their value.

Never mind that “proportionate” responses are never how a nation should respond. After Pearl Harbor we didn’t respond by bombing Kure Naval Base, killing exactly 2,400 Japanese, and then going home. We didn’t respond to the Lusitania sinking by demanding Imperial Germany load up a similar sized German vessel with 1,100 civilians so we could sink it. Nor was the Iranian response to Saddam’s limited invasion of Khuzestan province to invade a similar Iraqi province but to attempt to overthrow Saddam and occupy Iraq. In the world of geopolitics this is a non-issue.

This also touches on the similar Muslim talking point that the world in general and America in particular care a lot more about Israeli babies than Arab ones. Last I checked it wasn’t the Israelis but the Arabs who are sending their children on “martyrdom operations” and who are setting up rocket launchers and terrorist safe houses in places with lots of children about. Adding the Iranians to the mix again, it was they and not the Israelis who used their young boys by the hundreds of thousands as human mine clearers and machine gun fodder. Even if the Muslims are right about us caring more about Israeli babies than theirs (which I would disagree with that), the real questions are why do they expect others to care more about their children than they themselves do and why they don't care about either their babies or Israel's.

Next up is another frequent claim by various “moderate” Muslims that stereotyping Muslims as terrorists is angering them and producing more terrorists. So angry at being considered the prime source for suicide bombers, bus bombers, school kid murderers, and beheaders they are going to disabuse us of this notion by….producing more suicide bombers, bus bombers, school kid murderers, and beheaders. Well I don’t know about you, but I’m certainly disabused. However, to be fair to Muslims, I will fully agree we need to focus more attention on elderly Japanese women’s Mahjong groups the first time one carries out a grade school massacre or bus bombing. Also I should note that I have no problem with hardline approaches against other terrorists like the ETA and IRA (to the point that I think the British should have invaded Ireland in the 60’s or 70’s for allowing the IRA to operate there). The attention on Muslims has nothing to do with their religion (except inasmuch as it motivates their actions and therefore requires us to pay attention to them) and the sooner “moderate” Muslims accept that and help us battle a common enemy, the sooner we can stop worrying about Muslims as terrorists.

Yet another in the seemingly endless series of lessons on the importance of deterrence

According to Hezbollah leader Nasrallah, had he known that the Israelis would respond as forcefully as they did to the kidnapping of their soldiers, he would never have ordered it. Even though Olmert never ordered the killing blow, the possibility was always there. This is not only a reminder that non-Westerners are not the military masterminds and adept students of Sun Tzu that lefties imagine them to be, but also of the value of deterrence.

The cause of deterrence is simply the belief that any action against another nation will result in so massive a retaliation (yes, that means disproportionate retaliation) that it is not worth it to take the initial action, in this case kidnapping or killing a dozen Israeli soldiers. What we saw with Hezbollah was the effect of years of lefty weakness in Israel. This was supposed to inspire a willingness to compromise in the terrorists but as we saw (and as the right predicted) has only whipped up a willingness to push the envelope against Israel.

We can only hope that Hezbollah has learned its lesson this time. However, since it is still alive, in all likelihood all it has learned is the need for bigger rockets next time. More critically is the lesson that the other nations in the region have taken. Whatever the deterrence effect Israel may have had on terrorists, it hasn’t had any on the nations of the region. Iran now feels free to attack Romanian and Azerbaijani oil platforms, Syria is openly declaring hatred for Israel and the need to conquer the Golan, Egypt is establishing ties with Iran for the first time and some are pushing for an end to the peace treaty with Israel, and Turkey is continuing her move away from the “Phantom Alliance” and secularism and towards Islamism.

I know lefties hate acting tough, much less actually being tough, but in the real world it’s a lot cheaper and better for everyone to make 100 nations fear you will go to war than to have to go to war with even one nation. One would think that with history, even recent history like Iraq, showing the value of deterrence and making your enemy believe that you will go to war this would be obvious to everyone. Sadly, it isn’t and sadly we, like Israel, will pay the price for it again and again in the future.

Some suggested reading

Caroline Glick of the Jerusalem Post has written an editorial (here) that excellently spells out what is at stake in Israel’s war against Hezbollah and why it is important to the free world that Israel wins. I would recommend regularly reading her editorials anyways as she is one of the smartest and insightful people in Israel (or the rest of the world for that matter).

Meanwhile over at the National Review there is a copy an article (here) that does a great job explaining the inevitability of war with Iran.

Both are concepts that I’ve been writing about for the last month (I know I should have written about them earlier, but my blog hasn’t even been around for 3 months yet). Nevertheless, since both of these writers are paid for their work their articles are both much longer than mine so they are both good reading.

It's almost about time

I guess this is good news, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert has only taken 9 or so days to move from possibly maybe ordering an offensive for some point in the future to ordering an offensive for some point in the future. It took him around 14 days to reach that first point so he at least deserves good marks for improvement. His behavior reminds me of Grant’s comment at the Siege of Chattanooga that General Rosecrans was acting like a duck smacked on the head (too bad Olmert doesn’t have a superior who could replace him). We can only hope that this offensive, if it does happen, is handled in a much better manner than the previous month was. I also hope he hasn’t exhausted U.S. support with his idiotic and drawn out campaign. Of course, if we weren’t going to support Israel however they dealt with Hezbollah President Bush should have been “encouraging” Olmert to either invade sooner or stop sooner. Anyways, what’s done is done. It’s just a shame we can't have more faith that Olmert will finish what must be done.

It's The Olmert & Peretz Show!! Tonite's episode: Who's in Beirut?

Well I intended to write a latest news oriented post about Israel. Then I find out there is no latest news except for the continuing Abbott and Costello routine of the Prime Minister Olmert and Defense Minister Peretz. Apparently, 1 week after I first heard about the plan to push to the Litani, Costello has approved one but Abbott hasn’t ordered it into action yet. Thinking about it, I guess that explains the indecision within the Israeli government. I would guess that Olmert and Peretz are in an infinite "Who's on first" loop:

Olmert: Defense Minister Peretz, we have to get rid of the terror leaders in our region. Tell me where they are and their names.
Peretz: All right. But you know, strange as it may seem, they give terrorist leaders nowadays very peculiar names in the Israeli Defense Ministry.
Olmert: Funny names?
Peretz: Nicknames, pet names. Now, in our region Who's in Beirut, What's in Damascus, I Don't Know is in Tehran ---
Olmert: That's what I want to find out; I want you to tell me the names of the terrorist leaders in our region.
Peretz: I'm telling you: Who's in Beirut, What's in Damascus, I Don't Know is in Tehran.
Olmert: You know their names?
Peretz: Yes.
Olmert: Well, then, who's in Beirut?
Peretz: Yes.
Olmert: I mean the terrorist leader in Beirut’s name.
Peretz: Who.
Olmert: The terrorist leader in Beirut.
Peretz: Who is in Beirut.
Olmert: Well what are you askin' me for?
Peretz: I'm not asking you---I'm telling you: Who is in Beirut.
Olmert: I'm asking you---who's in Beirut?
Peretz: That's the man's name!
Olmert: That's who's name?
Peretz: Yes.
Olmert: Well go ahead and tell me.
Peretz: Who.
Olmert: The guy in Beirut.
Peretz: Who.
Olmert: The terror leader in Beirut!
Peretz: Who is in Beirut!
Olmert: Is there a terror leader in Beirut?
Peretz: Certainly!
Olmert: Then who's leading the terrorists in Beirut?
Peretz: Absolutely!
Olmert: When you try to bomb the terror mastermind in Beirut, who gets the bombs?
Peretz: Every one of them! And why not, the man's entitled to them.
Olmert: Who is?
Peretz: Yes.
Olmert: So who gets the bombs?
Peretz: Why shouldn't he? Sometimes his underlings get them.
Olmert: Who's underlings?
Peretz: Yes. After all, the man deserves it.
Olmert: Who does?
Peretz: Absolutely.
Olmert: All I'm trying to find out is what's the Islamo-fascist’s name in Beirut.
Peretz: Oh, no, no, What is in Damascus.
Olmert: I'm not asking you who's in Damascus.
Peretz: Who's in Beirut.
Olmert: That's what I'm trying to find out!
Peretz: Well, don't change the terror leaders around!
Olmert: I'm not changing nobody!
Peretz: Now, take it easy.
Olmert: What's the guy's name in Beirut?
Peretz: What's the guy's name in Damascus.
Olmert: I'm not askin' ya who's in Damascus.
Peretz: Who's in Beirut.
Olmert: I don't know.
Peretz: He's in Tehran. We're not talking about him.
Olmert: How did I get in Tehran?
Peretz: You mentioned his name.
Olmert: If I mentioned the Tehran terrorist leader's name, who did I say is in Tehran?
Peretz: No, Who's in Beirut.
Olmert: Stay outta Beirut, will ya?!
Peretz: Well, what do you want me to do?
Olmert: Now what's the guy's name in Tehran?
Peretz: What's in Damascus.
Olmert: I'm not asking ya who's in Damascus.
Peretz: Who's in Beirut.
Olmert: I don't know.
Peretz: He's in Tehran.
Olmert: There I go, back in Tehran again.
Peretz: Well, I can't change their names.
Olmert: Will you please stay in Tehran?
Peretz: Please. Now what is it you want to know?
Olmert: What is the fellow's name in Tehran.
Peretz: What is the fellow's name in Damascus.
Olmert: I'm not askin' ya who's in Damascus!
Peretz: Who's in Beirut.
Olmert: I don't know.
Peretz & Olmert: Tehran!

Almost four weeks later and they still can't agree on who's in Beirut. Funny on the little screen, tragic in real life.

In the real world, perception matters as much as reality

Note: I'm a parttimer so I'm not exactly sure of how such things are handled in the blog world or if they matter, I left out a couple things in the original post and added them in two places thanks to the persons credited. I was also linked to by the people, thanks to both for that, who pointed out the ommissions so I know I don't have many visitors but they're something to check out.

One of the major problems with Olmert’s slow-mo strategy against Hezbollah is that it is putting what's left of (thanks Yaakov) Israel’s hard earned aura of invincibility at risk. I know that since leftists don’t believe that such emotions are supposed to impact national decision making, Olmert probably doesn’t think it’s an issue. The problem is not that his policy is causing the IDF to be defeated in battle at the hands of Hezbollah but that it is creating that perception for the vast majority of the world that doesn’t understand military affairs.

We are beginning to see more and more stories like this one about Hezbollah stopping the vaunted Israeli something (in this case tanks). The cable news is also beginning to report everything from the angle of the plucky underdog Hezbollah running circles around the plodding Israelis. Even Fox has sunk to those levels with host John Gibson saying something to the effect that Hezbollah has gutted the IDF. The only thing the non-military minded media would understand as an Israeli success is if a) the Israelis made it to the Litani River or b) the Israelis finished the fighting sooner. I have heard the incompetent union boss Israeli Defense Minister say on each of the last two days that the IDF will drive to the Litani. Yet, except for a report of an Israeli commando raid on Tyre, still no action.

This all masks what has been a fairly successful fight against Hezbollah by the Israelis and one that on strictly military terms is going very badly for Hezbollah. Yes, Hezbollah is not your standard Arab military force. It’s essentially a modern day equivalent of the post-World War II Jordanian Arab Legion. It is a smallish long term professional force trained, equipped, and led by a foreign backer. Despite all the advantages that Hezbollah enjoys, good training, high morale, good weapons, excellent defensive terrain to defend, 6 years to prepare defenses and to learn the lay of the land, using civilians as shields to restrict the actions of the humane Israelis (thanks Joe Settler), new tactics that the Israelis must adapt to, and a politically hobbled IDF offensive, Hezbollah is still taking casualties at between a 5 and 10 to 1 ratio. That is hardly better than Syria’s 8:1 ratio in 1982 fighting in the same area and far worse than the Arab Legion who gave as good as they got (and maybe even better) in 1948. The military problem for Hezbollah is that it is not your standard Arab militia force like those seen in the Palestinian areas and in Iraq. Those forces simply take a young man, give him a rifle and send him off to be killed. Losses do not affect them. Losses do affect a professional long term force. When Hezbollah loses say 7 fighters to one Israeli it is losing hard to replace fighters who took years to train and prepare. It is also a far greater portion of their fighting force. Meanwhile Israel loses a small share of its army and the rest gain combat experience that will benefit them and Israel for decades to come.

If the Israelis are doing fairly well in even their constrained environment, then why are they perceived to be losing? Simply put, because they aren’t advancing and they aren’t finishing the job quickly. There can be good reasons for a slow-mo approach, mainly it tends to limit casualties and fatigue within the military. The problem here is not just that Israel doesn’t have the time for this (the U.S. and France have agreed to a ceasefire resolution) but also because it causes this perception that no matter how successful Israel is in this village or that village, they are losing. This is extremely dangerous for a small country that depends on her “invincible” military for defense.

Having your enemies believe you are invincible can be one of the most important aspects in a battle. Prussia in the 18th Century was a relatively small power. Even so she was considered one of the major powers of Europe because of her excellent conscript army. Combined with the exceptional leadership of Frederick the Great the army would turn Prussia from a great power in name only into a real one. It would build such a reputation that all of Europe feared facing the Prussian army. Even Napoleon was scared to fight it in 1806. Following its crushing defeat by Napoleon, no one feared the Prussians as much anymore. This led to the humiliation by Austria at Olmutz in 1850. It took much reform and 2 spectacular victories to earn Prussia her reputation back. As for Napoleon, one of the interesting things about the success of his Grand Armee was how many times Napoleon and the army messed up and were saved simply because their enemy believed it was a clever trap and didn’t take advantage of it. After Wagram in 1809 his opponents began to realize that he was just a man who could be defeated and Napoleon’s successes began to decline. Within in the Grand Armee a further mystique built up around the “Old Guard”. They were Napoleon’s finest soldiers and had never been defeated in battle. The cause of the rout of the French army at Waterloo was when the Old Guard wasn’t defeated but simply wavered. The rest of the army saw the “invincible” Old Guard waver and panicked into a headlong rout. You can also see this dynamic in the Union generals who began to greatly fear General Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia during the American Civil War. One general who didn’t fear Lee was Grant, and after their first encounter at the Battle of the Wilderness in 1864, Grant had to convince his frightened generals to pursue Lee by tell them something like “you behave as though General Lee can somersault his entire army over our heads and into our rear”. Once Lee ran into a general who wasn’t afraid of him or his army, his success also declined.

Israel is in a similar situation today. The Israelis probably could not hold back a continual effort by the Arabs to defeat her. Even Frederick the Great’s Prussia could last only 7 years before fate saved them. One important aspect of Israel’s survival is inculcating the notion that she can never be defeated. This caused the Jordanians to give up their war with Israel around 1970. The Egyptians were somewhat done with their bloodlust prior to 1973. 1956 and 1967 had already convinced them of Israel’s superiority. What caused them to try one more time against Israel was Israel’s poor showing in the War of Attrition. If Israel allows her perceived invincibility to disappear because Olmert either doesn’t know what to do or is trying to limit casualties then it will simply set herself up for major problems down the road. Egypt and Jordan probably won’t return to the fight, but Ahmadinejad is watching from afar. Like a predator, he is hovering, waiting for the Israelis to appear wounded. He would obviously love nothing more than to bring down the Jewish state. Meanwhile, Olmert is having the IDF do their best wounded animal impression. This is not a good combination. Can Israel survive a conventional war with Syria, a massive guerrilla war in Lebanon, a major uprising in the Palestinian areas, all supported by Iran? Probably, but still no reason to make it a possibility by appearing to lose.

A hodgepodge of random Mideast thoughts

Well I'm back from my college forced "vacation". I thought a break from thinking about Olmert's lack of thinking would do me some good but it hasn't. This isn't as heavy as my posts normally are, but I haven't seen much news in the last few days so I'll need to ease back into the news cycle.

First off, I still have no idea what Olmert’s plan is. I know, I never did, but I at least understood what was happening. However, like the orbat.com editor (2:30 Aug 3rd), I am also now having a hard time simply understanding what it is the Israeli leadership is doing anymore (that’s not just because I’ve been relatively out of the loop this last week). Olmert’s rhetoric seems to be more and more divorced from reality on the ground. At least with Bint Jbail there was some semblance between what the Olmert government was saying was happening and what was happening. I think it was last week that the Israelis began discussing pushing to the Litani River. The IDF has at least 9 active and 3 reserve brigades (likely several more of each) or 30-50,000 soldiers in northern Israel. A week would have been more than enough time to push the 10-18 miles to the Litani River for a force of that size. Yet at the moment it appears they are staging Bint Jbail style assaults in 3 or 4 locations. Jpost.com says these operations involve only 10,000 troops from 8 brigades. Initially, given Olmert’s rhetoric, I thought these were the advance guards of the 4 columns that would finally advance to the Litani. One week later, they still seem to be rotating small groups of troops in and out for shallow thrusts into Lebanon. I understand the Israelis need to clear out the towns and arms caches, but that is no reason not to send 2 or 3 active divisions to the Litani while 2 or 3 reserve divisions conduct the clearing operations in the rear. The problem doesn’t appear to be Hezbollah resistance. The Israelis are giving much better than they are receiving (19 to 3 yesterday according to JPost.com) and Hezbollah has far fewer fighters than Israel. The only thing I can think is that Olmert still doesn't understand he is running out of time and thinks he has as long as he needs to do this as casualty free as possible. If it isn’t Olmert then I have no idea what the problem is.

As if the quite extensive list needed any more entries, Prime Minister Olmert has again shown that he lacks any strategic sense. He actually claimed last week that the fighting in Gaza and Lebanon adds impetus to the West Bank pullout plan. Apparently the problems following the Gaza and Lebanon withdrawals aren’t enough for him. At the most basic, any such pullout would leave Jerusalem under the shadow of Palestinian rockets. The wall Olmert wants to hide behind only stops suicide bombers, not rockets. The only possible argument I have heard in favor of this idea was by NPR correspondent Mara Liasson on Special Report with Brit Hume, who stated that it was a good idea since the world would stand by Israel if she were attacked from the Palestinian areas. Just like with Gaza and Lebanon the world will initially be sympathetic until Israel tries to defend herself. I know the left considers the world’s sympathy to be sacrosanct, but in the real world it has little value. After all, Czechoslovakia had plenty of sympathy in 1939 and 1968 and that sure did a lot of good. He must really believe the leftwing motto, “fool me 7 times, shame on you, fool me 8 or more times shame on me”. I hope the Israelis can vote him out soon since they don’t have 8 times to wait for Olmert and the left to wake up to reality.

This news story summarizes the draft UN resolution for a cease fire in Lebanon that is circulating. What fantasy world do diplomats live in that they think this has any chance of solving the problem? Every single part of the resolution is impossible to implement in any real way. The first part demands an immediate cessation of hostilities. Uh huh. The only reason Hezbollah will quit is if it's losing and if it is losing the Israelis shouldn't let them quit. I know after that for a starter there’s little reason to continue looking at the rest of the faux demands but let’s continue. In exchange for this cease fire, Hezbollah will disarm as per UN resolution 1559. So Hezbollah will be given the chance to ignore 2 UN resolutions. Ah well, they’re still a lightweight in that category as far as Saddam Hussein was concerned. At this rate it’ll only take 12 years and 15 more UN resolutions before Hezbollah is disarmed. Anyways, back to fantasy land, Hezbollah will also return the 2 kidnapped Israeli soldiers and Israel will release some Hezbollah prisoners. In other words, Hezbollah will get what it wanted all along. To enforce all of this, a robust international force will enter southern Lebanon and will keep the peace along with the Lebanese army. Never mind that no one wants to or has troops to send to Lebanon. Never mind that the Lebanese army is completely incapable of doing anything and that at least 1/3 of the army would support Hezbollah given the chance. Never mind that this would require the Israelis to finish clearing out Hezbollah south of the Litani before this phantom force could arrive; something that won’t happen if Israel is stopped now. To top it off, they actually believe this cease-fire would hold.

There you have it, a lot has happened in the Mideast last week. The IDF was allowed to modestly step up operations but is still being hobbled by poor and indecisive leadership. Prime Minster Olmert continues to provide that poor and indecisive leadership. Lastly, the diplomats and internationalists continue drafting unworkable plans based on some alternate reality. So as much as has happened, far less has changed.

An addendum to the previous post about "Unexpected Hezbollah resistance"

I’ve been hesitant for several reasons to write about any tactical level mistakes the Israelis may have made in their ill-fated Lebanon operation. The main reason is that it is obviously very difficult to know how many units of what type are involved, much less also what unit they are and any sub units they may have attached. It is even less certain where or how those units were used. We also do not know whether the army or the defense minister determined the makeup of the forces involved. Despite this, it is an important aspect of the issue so I figure I may as well write based on what I have been able to glean from news stories. I may be completely wrong, or I may be right and you may have read it here first (probably not).

This story from the Jerusalem Post indicates that the brigade size force in southern Lebanon consisted of 2 armored battalions with infantry battalions in support. Another story from the Jerusalem Post states that the 51st Battalion of the Golani Brigade (infantry) was involved so that would seem to be the non-paratrooper infantry support mentioned in the other story. The paratrooper battalion mentioned in this wiki article and in the Jpost story was most likely supporting the armor battalions since the Merkava tank that they are equipped with is also an APC. The 12th Battalion of the Golani Brigade appears to have been rotated in to replace the 51st which was pulled out. Based on this information and common military organization, my guess would be that the operation consisted of 2 armor battalions, 1 paratrooper battalion, 1 infantry battalion, 1 recon company, 1 special forces company, along with some combat engineer support. It’s hard to say whether this is both brigades, or if the second brigade was in Israel since the Israelis seem to have rotated troops every few days. I would assume that the second brigade was in Israel while the other is in Lebanon since 8 battalions should have been enough for the operation. This would be a pretty standard armor force so wouldn’t strike me as surprising in general.

While in general this is a balanced armored force it is not balanced for its mission. It must not only fight to secure 3 large villages (or small towns) but also hold around 10 miles of frontage. In addition to that it must fight an unknown number of Hezbollah fighters in difficult terrain. I’ve heard estimates of 200-300 fighters in Bint Jbail and 100-200 in Maroun a-Ras, with no info on the numbers in the third village or in the hills in the area. The head of the IDF said in a news conference on Fox that they estimate that at the low end 200 Hezbollah have been killed (in line with my estimate of 200-300 in the previous post). If that is the case, combined with the continuing fighting there must have been around 1,500 to 2,000 fighters, including reinforcements, in the area. Given the defensive preparations, the terrain, the quality and size of the enemy force, and the area involved it was a tall order to expect a single (or even two) armor brigades to achieve anything permanent.

An added difficulty for the Israelis is that their battalions are small compared the American battalions. (Note: I used the computer game WinSPMBT to obtain the TO&E's for the various units described below.) An Israeli force as outlined above would consist of just 66 tanks, 44 IFV/APC’s, 580 infantry, and around 1,400 combat soldiers total. A similar U.S. Army force would have 93 tanks, 73 IFV/APC’s, 720 infantry, and about 1,800 combat soldiers. A U.S. Marine Corps force would be even larger (they use some of the largest battalions in the world) with 140 tanks, 43 IFV/APC’s, 1,030 infantry, and 2,400 combat soldiers. These 4 small Israeli battalions were ordered to clear three villages with at least 300 fighters (more likely twice that number) while also fighting upwards of 1,000 fighters in the hills around the villages. By comparison, in 2004 we deployed 11 larger battalion equivalents (5 1/3 Marine, 2 2/3 armor, 2 LAR, and 1 mech inf), with greater fire and intelligence support, to solely root out the approximately 2,500 insurgent/terrorist fighters in Fallujah. Our attack force had 112 tanks, 200 IFV/APC’s, and 3,300 infantry. When we required 3,300 infantry to clear out 2,500 fighters, it is silly to think the Israelis could defeat 300-600 fighters plus hold off around 1,000 around the villages with only 580 infantry. Also of interest is the infantry:tank ratios. The Israelis are using a very low ratio of 8.8 infantry per tank. That is fine for maneuver warfare on the Damascus plain but not to attack villages in the hills. Attacking in an urban environment at Fallujah we used a ratio of 29.5 infantry per tank.

As the second JPost story indicates, the Israelis were attacking Bint Jbail with its minimum 200 defenders with only 2 companies of infantry or about 180 soldiers. Due to their small size they had to attack from the same side of the town. When things went bad they had to rush in 2 other infantry companies from wherever they were (Maroun a-Ras or guarding against Hezbollah attacks from the hills?) denuding the tanks on the perimeter line of their infantry support and/or stalling the attacks on the other villages. In 1982 the Israelis sent an entire armored division through the same area even though it wasn’t the main focal point of either the PLO or the Syrian defenses. A similar sized force would be required to take the villages in a few days time (10 battalions total, 2 for Bint Jbail, 1 each for the other 2 villages, 3 or 4 for the perimeter line, and the rest in reserve).

This is not to say the Israelis have not had an effect in hurting Hezbollah. They have definitely caused a good number of casualties. However, victory is not just decided by kill ratios. Olmert’s ignominious withdrawal is a victory for the Hezbollah. Although Hezbollah will claim it as a major victory that they won, it was handed to them by Olmert. The Israelis have more than enough military power to secure 3 villages in southern Lebanon held by less than 2,000 defenders. They have enough to easily secure the southern third of Lebanon if they wanted to. That they do not use it, or use it efficiently, is not the fault of the Israeli soldiers or possibly their commanders, but of Prime Minister Olmert. Again, we don't know exactly what was used, or how, so I could be wrong, this is just my best informed guess.

Random thoughts on the Mideast crisis 2 -- Unexpected Hezbollah resistance?

A few thoughts on the “difficulties” Israel is having according to media reports. The IDF is of course denying that the level of resistance is unexpected. However, clearly the fighting has been very tough, much tougher at least than most people outside of the IDF expected. The question is, why has it taken the IDF over a week now to secure two small towns in Lebanon when they made it to Beirut in 4 days in 1982? There are, I think, 3 reasons for this. First, as many reporters have recently discovered, Hezbollah is not your typical Arab fighting force. Second, this is the early stages of the conflict when, as is usually the case, counters to the enemy’s new tactics must be developed. Lastly, and probably most importantly, this is small operation that is limiting Israel’s capabilities while enhancing Hezbollah’s. The fact that despite all of these advantages Hezbollah is taking a beating simply shows how much more capable the Israeli soldier is.

The Arabs are almost in a class of their own when it comes to military ineffectiveness. I believe it was Moshe Dayan who when asked how other countries could replicate Israel’s stunning military prowess replied simply, “Fight Arabs.” The primary problem in Arab armies is a lack of professionalism and competence in their junior commissioned and non-commissioned officers, the backbone of any military force. Hezbollah's advantage is that it has not been trained by Arabs like the PLO, but by Iranians. While Iranians are not the greatest soldiers in the world, they are far superior to the Arabs. During the Iran-Iraq war, despite being completely outclassed by the Iraqis in firepower and maneuver capability, the Iranians time and time again defeated the Iraqis on the battlefield with simplistic yet effective tactics. The added dimension of Persian professionalism is enough to make Hezbollah a much more capable force than any other (with the possible exception of the British trained Jordanian Arab Legion in 1948 and 1967) that the Israelis have faced. Again, not the S.S. style supermen the press is making them out to be, but still a tougher opponent than just about any Arab army the Israelis have faced before.

In the early stages of any conflict it is often the case that many mistakes are made. Israel is no stranger to this reality. In 1973, Israeli armor raced forward immediately after the Egyptians attacked to fight like it was 1967 when most of the battles in the Sinai resembled naval battles with columns of tanks duking it out at long range. The Israelis didn’t understand the effect that the large quantities of the Soviet AT-3 “Sagger” anti-tank missiles the Egyptians had purchased in between the wars would have. The unsupported Israeli tanks drove into ambushes all along the front. In 2 days the Israelis lost 200 out of 300 tanks in the Sinai. By day 3 or 4 the Israelis figured out how to counter the Egyptian anti-tank teams and were able in a matter of weeks to relatively easily throw the Egyptians back across the Suez Canal. In 1982 the Israelis sent 4 large columns into Lebanon. They planned for a quick operation with the PLO or Syrians guarding the roads and passes. Instead they were instantly ambushed by infantry and even tanks positioned on the hills over the roads. The Syrians had fought for a year in Lebanon without ever figuring out how to deal with this tactic. The Israelis took about a day to realize they would have to advance slowly with infantry teams in the hills shadowing the armor columns.

In both cases the Israelis initially took heavy losses but quickly devised countermeasures that negated the effectiveness of these tactics. It is the same today. The Israeli offensive is so far about a week old, though only the last 3 or 4 days have seen operations of any size. It is not surprising then that the Israelis would have lost several tanks and a dozen or so soldiers to Hezbollah’s new tactics. By now though, the Israelis should have developed new tactics of their own to counter Hezbollah’s. It’s too early to say it’s a trend, but we can already see some changes in the casualty totals. On the 26th the IDF lost 8 soldiers to Hezbollah’s roughly 20 dead in the town of Bint Jbail while on the 28th the Israelis suffered no dead in a battle in Bint Jbail that saw 26 Hezbollah killed. This is why I expected the Israelis to invade initially with a brigade size force (around 2,000-3,000 soldiers) for a few days to discover Hezbollah’s new tricks.

Unfortunately, Hezbollah being a more formidable opponent and the nature of early fighting in a new war are not the only cause of Israel’s apparent troubles. Israel’s superb officer corps seems to be fixing any problems with their tactics. However, they can’t do anything about bad operational and strategic decisions from higher up. While the current IDF offensive is definitely causing significant casualties to Hezbollah (so far at least 200-300 dead and 2-3 times that wounded) it is not doing it quickly or effectively enough. The problem is that the Israelis have pushed a single brigade into a roughly 2 X 4 mile rectangle of southern Lebanon. This leaves no room for the operational maneuver at which Israel excels. The Israelis soldiers are being forced into frontal assaults on prepared Hezbollah positions. Hezbollah is also undoubtedly reinforcing their positions around this rectangle with fighters from other parts of southern Lebanon. In effect the Israelis are fighting Hezbollah with the type frontal attritional strategy that the Arabs or Soviets would use. It will work given enough time and given morale that won’t break under the higher than necessary casualties. The problem for Olmert is that Israel doesn’t have enough time and the best armies tend to crack under such a strategy no matter how successful it is (for example, at the Battle of Verdun the German army succeeded in its mission, killing more French than they lost, but good soldiers don’t like being used in such a manner and it lead to the fall of Falkenheyn as head of the German army). The Israeli ground commanders are calling for a bigger offensive that will necessarily include maneuver rather than a continuation of the current attritional strategy.

These are the main reasons I think Israel is experiencing higher than anticipated casualties. This casualty bump will in time, if not already, decline. Over time, as Hezbollah’s core cadres are eliminated and the Israelis push past their prepared defensives, their effectiveness will drop. Hezbollah’s new tactics have probably already lost their effect as the far more capable Israelis find ways to defeat them. The last part is up to Olmert. He can continue the strategy of trading 1 Israeli for x number of Hezbollah, expand the offensive as the army wants to so as to get it over with quicker and at a better kill ratio, or he can pull back the ground forces and return to the casualty free (for the Israelis and Hezbollah) air campaign. At any rate, given the Olmert’s decisions and the nature of war, the casualties and tough fighting in southern Lebanon is nothing surprising.

Random thoughts on the Mideast crisis 1 -- Elections matter

We are again seeing both in Israel and here that elections do have consequences. Any conservatives or Republicans who are wary of voting for their party this November should be aware of this. In Israel they had a choice last March between Ehud Olmert and Benyamin Netanyahu. Ehud Olmert won promising to disengage from the Arabs. Thanks to that policy the Israelis are more engaged than ever with the Arabs. As was entirely anticipated, unilaterally withdrawing from the Gaza strip, after doing the same in Lebanon, and then drawing up plans to withdraw from Judea/Samaria simply emboldened Israel’s Arab enemies. After his policy blew up so quickly, Olmert reacted as a typical leftist leader, he played tougher than thou art.

As with other leftwing leaders though, Olmert is discovering you have to do more than act tough to win. The recent news that the Israeli cabinet refused to expand the operation, if true, is the latest evidence that the center-left government in Israel either doesn’t understand what it is doing or that it is consciously passing up a golden opportunity. I doubt Netanyahu would have botched the response this badly (I should mention that I’ve been a Bibi fan since 96). Netanyahu has shown again and again that he understands the situation Israel is facing better than the Labor Party. He was rightly suspicious of the Oslo Accords and then led the charge against the misguided Gaza withdrawals. He also seems in his TV interviews to have a clear understanding of what is going on vis-à-vis Iran and Syria. Unlike John Kerry, I’m not saying that had Netanyahu won there would have been no trouble, just that he would have handled it better.

Our Democrats are in the same strategic rut as Olmert. While their former presidential candidate is running around bragging about his omnipotence (well, at least he claims to be omnipotent enough that he can cut the Gordian Knot that is Mideast peace while at the same preventing mega hurricanes from hitting us, although he's apparently not omnipotent enough to win an election), they bicker over whether their motto should be “strong and smart” or “tough and smart” despite not being any of those things. They walk out on the first Iraqi Prime Minister because he is just an American puppet, then they walk out on this Iraqi Prime Minister because he isn’t an American puppet. Is that the kind of leadership we want in America during these times of change? Do we as conservatives, Republicans, and Americans really want to saddle our nation with an immature and petulant Democrat Congress who will ensure that our country pays any price and bears any burden to see that President Bush is humiliated? If it is worth it to punish the Republican Party for whatever sins it has committed then just understand the price our nation and the world will pay for such a decision. Israel is discovering the effect elections have, let’s not repeat their mistake

For Israel's Lebanon operation it's not the end of the beginning but the beginning of the end

As I have been saying since the beginning of the Israeli crises with Hezbollah, time is everything. I understand the Israeli leadership wants to take its time so as to limit the number of casualties on both sides. However, as this news story from Fox news shows, they are fast running out of time. Even though we are staunch allies of Israel, we cannot hold the entire world at bay forever. Prime Minister Olmert doesn’t seem to understand this.

In today’s 24/7 media coverage it is necessary to act, as the U.S. military likes to say, inside your enemies decision cycle. In any conflict between a free peoples and terrorists the media is going to be with the enemy of the free peoples. From Iraq, to Afghanistan, to defensive measures in the U.S., the media is relentlessly and needlessly negative. For Israel this means that the negative media coverage will steadily lower support for her around the world and increase calls by foreign leaders for an end to the violence. We saw this effect most notably in Europe where an even worse press than that in the US combined with latent anti-Semitism to cause European governments to call for an end of Israel’s operation in less than a week. What’s worse is an invasion now will be seen as destroying any hopes for diplomacy causing even more outraged press reports and international pressure on us. The Israelis are also one misplaced air strike killing dozens (or even hundreds) of civilians away from a media explosion that will quickly doom its operations in Lebanon. It was foolish for the Israeli government to believe that we could give them as long as they could possibly desire to deal with Hezbollah.

Regarding Lebanon in particular, it was clear from watching the news that early on the news channels were not sure how to report what was happening. Initial news reports were largely favorable to Israel as she had been attacked with no reason by a terrorist organization. It was about a week before the reporters who had nothing else to do in Israel learned about Operation “Peace for the Galilee” and its convenient link to that favorite historical event for the left, Vietnam. As with Iraq, the story then became about wily supermen terrorists confounding the plodding Israeli Defense Forces at every turn. In addition, the media has begun casting Israel and Hezbollah as equal in blame. Leaders of free nations have to understand that they must act within the decision cycle of the puerile adversarial press. Just as the press figured out its angle to the Israel-Hezbollah fight, the Israelis should have had the invasion going to give the press something else to figure out. You have to give the press so much to talk about that reporters cannot just sit back and figure out the most negative light to cast on the issue.

Now if I may engage in a bit of armchair prime ministering for a moment. I’m not saying Israel should have rushed into Lebanon on day 1. Obviously, the military would not have been prepared for a major operation so soon. I had expected the Israelis to begin sending in battalion and then brigade size formations around day 3 or 4 (like the current operation of 2 armor battalions plus some infantry). They would gain a better knowledge of Hezbollah’s locations and any new ambush tactics so as not to repeat a mistake from 1982 when four large columns blitzed into Lebanon and were instantly and unexpectedly ambushed from the hills. I thought by day 7 (when media attitudes not surprisingly began to turn against Israel) the full invasion would have begun.

It took the IDF only 4 days to reach Beirut in 1982 despite the unexpected enemy tactics and difficulties with the terrain. I know the fighting is and will be tough, but part of the current problem is that with only one operational thrust the Hezbollah fighters can gather around it. The Israelis are not taking advantage of their far superior capability at operational maneuver to present multiple shifting thrusts that Hezbollah cannot keep up with. You also need multiple thrusts so that less pressed ones can attack the flanks and rear of Hezbollah concentrations that are resisting other thrusts (I know its hilly to mountainous in Lebanon but the tactics are still possible especially with airmobile infantry).

Granted I don’t know how many ugdot (sort of small divisions with no fixed organization) are in Northern Israel (I’ve heard 3 along with 1 reserve) but it seems as though a similar amount of time would be reasonable to secure Lebanon (except Tyre maybe) up to the Litani River and Marjayoun. From that position Olmert could be looking today at negotiations or a possible second jump to the Awali River and into the Bekaa Valley. Meanwhile the reserve ugdah could be going house to house and mosque to mosque searching for Hezbollah’s weapons in the south. It would make the insertion of an international force much easier as Hezbollah will have been cleared from the south, and Israel can hold withdrawing a bargaining chip in the negotiations with Lebanon.

Whatever the Israelis decided in this situation, they would have held the initiative throughout. At worst, Hezbollah would have been badly bloodied and in no position to cause trouble again for a while. The Israelis could then hold the possibility of repeating this over the heads of the Lebanese to encourage them to stop Hezbollah this time. Whatever happened, it would be better than what were looking at now, a bruised but triumphant Hezbollah, an international force that will do nothing, and a Hezbollah that will quickly be ready for another thrashing of the Jew. Time is everything in these matters. With apparently 10-14 days left there is still time to achieve this, though again with much more media and international outcry. I began wondering on day 3 if Olmert knew what he was doing (his decisions in Gaza were already making me think he didn’t) and nothing since then has indicated that he does. However, I don’t know everything that is going on and he could be pursuing an entirely different strategy as outlined by the orbat.com editor (I don’t know how to link to a certain time or post on his website, its 0230 July 23). The idea was that all Olmert is trying to do is punish Lebanon as an example to the Arab world and get an international force inserted to keep Hezbollah away from the border. If that is his strategy than he is even more foolish than I thought and shows that not only Arabs can miss opportunities.

It's time for Operation "Peace for Haifa"

As these various news stories (AP, Reuters, and AP) indicate, time is running out for Olmert to do something about Hezbollah. In addition the negative nannies are in full force arguing Hezbollah can’t be destroyed so there is no purpose trying (see here and here). Though this is largely mistaken and is based on bad history regarding the 1982 "Peace for Galilee" operation, that's a topic for another post. The relevant point here is that this attitude will also eventually weigh on Israeli opinion. As I’ve written before (here and here), Israel stopping without dealing with Hezbollah would be a major disaster for Israel and the world. There is method behind Israel’s apparent madness with the bombing campaign but only if it is preliminary to a ground campaign. Otherwise, Israel will come out doubly worse with the Lebanese people since not only did Israelis cause such destruction, they didn’t even take care of Hezbollah.

The military historian in me understands the purpose of the bombing campaign and giving it a little time before invading. It is a classic interdiction campaign to prep the battlefield for a ground attack. It is not a strategic bombing campaign as the various analysts in the AP story claim (the differences are subtle since both campaigns largely target the same assets, but strategic campaigns target assets outside of the operational theatre, of course in Lebanon the entire country is the theatre of operation, and targets more things like factories and civilians that Israel hasn’t been hitting). Israel’s bombing campaign is directed at degrading Hezbollah’s ability to move men and supplies around while picking off what men and material present themselves as targets of opportunity. This requires things like destroying the roads, bridges, power plants, airports, and seaports. During it the Israelis can also attain a better picture of Hezbollah’s dispositions and defenses. By itself this will have little effect on Hezbollah long-term. Its primary purpose is to exhaust the supplies and stamina of the Hezbollah fighters while discovering and then freezing them in their defensive positions (as best as possible, it isn’t perfect of course). When the Israeli ground attack comes it will then be against slightly fewer gunmen who are more tired, lower on supplies, and in better known positions that can be destroyed in detail. Without a ground invasion the Hezbollah gunmen will eventually rest, resupply, make good their losses and be able to move about, negating the entire campaign. A good interdiction campaign takes time; the pre-D-Day interdiction campaign lasted for many months for example. The problem is that time is the very resource Israel is short on.

Military operations are not conducted in a vacuum. The political situation is critical and the political window for Israel to invade southern Lebanon is rapidly closing. Soon the international calls for the United States to restrain Israel will become too strong for Bush to resist. Combined with rising opposition in Israel, Olmert will increasingly find it difficult to deal with Hezbollah. Unfortunately, sometimes you have to commit military forces in situations that are less than auspicious. In the end when compared with options of calling off the offensive now or ending it later after causing more damage and anger in Lebanon, invading before the military may be ready is the least bad option. It should be noted that it's not obvious if the Israeli government has a clear idea of what it is doing. While the campaign appears to be a typical interdiction campaign to prepare for a ground invasion, it could also just be the outgrowth of a hit back and look tough policy that Olmert has lost control of. Olmert’s Kadima government is essentially left-wing and such poorly thought out strategic policies are common amongst left-wing leaders (think Bill find-me-an-aspirin-factory-and-empty-tents-to-bomb Clinton and Lyndon find-me-jungle-to-carpet-bomb Johnson). It should also be remembered that the Israeli government includes the Jimmy Carter of Israeli politics, Shimon Peres. Of course I am not saying Israel will invade Lebanon; I am just saying they need to and time is rapidly running out do it.

Israel's Caudine Forks moment

One of the main ideas of this blog is that the results of current decisions can be mostly known by comparing them to similar decisions and results from the past. If that is the case then what result can a decision by the Israeli government to halt its Lebanon operation have? There is one main historical example, Samnia’s decision at the Caudine Forks, and the example of Napoleon’s exile to Elba and the Versailles Treaty that back it up.

The Caudine Forks is a defile in the Central Italian section of the Apennine Mountains. In 321 BC, during the Second Samnite War between Rome and Samnia, the Samnites laid an ambush at the Caudine Forks. The Roman army marched into the defile only to find its exit barricaded. When they returned to the entrance they found it blocked by the Samnite army. At this point the Samnite leader didn’t know what to do so he contacted his father who told him to make peace with the Romans and let them go home unharmed. He didn’t find this satisfactory so he again asked his father what he should do. This time his father said to kill all the Romans. This was a bit unexpected given the first piece of advice and was also unacceptable. He summoned his father who explained that if he let the Romans go home in peace he would have made a friend in Rome and they wouldn’t have to fight again. If he killed all the Romans he would destroy Roman power so they wouldn’t have to fight again. The son chose the middle way, he disarmed and humiliated the Romans and sent them home. Angry and still with their strength, the Romans resumed the war 5 years later. They would ultimately destroy the Samnite peoples after a third war. The lesson was that trying to get the best of both worlds usually causes you to end up with the worst.

The next two examples reinforce the reality that the middle way is almost always the worse way. After defeating Napoleon in the 1813 campaign in Germany, the Coalition had a choice to make: destroy Bonapartism to its core, or leave it in charge of ante-bellum France. They tried the latter option but Napoleon thought it was ruse and refused to respond. That meant the only other option was to either kill or exile Bonaparte and to disband his army. The Coalition chose instead to give Napoleon the Italian Isle of Elba to rule and reduced but maintained his army while they created a humiliating peace treaty for France. Not surprisingly, the French and Napoleon were left angry and with a still formidable army waiting for its Emperor to lead it again. After victory in a nearly disastrous Waterloo campaign the Coalition did get it right the second time. Bonaparte was exiled to St. Helena in the South Atlantic, the army was disbanded, and France occupied. The end of World War I is also an example of this tendency to go halfway. After the German army surrendered to what it expected would be decent terms that reflected the situation on the battlefield, the Allies chose to instead pull a fast one on the Germans. They imposed a humiliating treaty that was in no way reflective of events on the ground and yet still left the mightiest nation in Europe the mightiest nation in Europe. All it did was leave German smarting for revenge and with the means to attain it.

Now were at a situation where the Israeli government is deciding whether to call off its offensive in Lebanon and accept a cease fire with Hezbollah. The Israelis have trapped Hezbollah. It made an incredibly stupid move and opened the door to Israel annihilating it. One difference in this case is there is no generous peace offer option with Hezbollah. If Hezbollah were surrounded at the Caudine Forks and the Samnites let them go home, that would only reinforce in Hezbollah’s eyes that Samnia is weak and needs to be destroyed. At any rate, any such possibilty is in the past now. Israel’s two decisions now are 1) go all the way and continue the offensive no matter how angry the Lebanese people get and destroy Hezbollah, 2) choose the middle way and stop it now after getting the Lebanese people angry and leave Hezbollah with the strength to come after Israel again, this time with the support of the Lebanese people. Whatever choice Olmert makes, the Lebanese people and Hezbollah are going to be angry at Israel (well double so in Hezbollah’s case if that’s possible). The difference is whether Olmert will leave the Lebanese people and Hezbollah the capacity to achieve their revenge. History shows time and time again that leaders mostly choose the middle way so it would not surprise me if Olmert does now. However, history also shows what will happen if he does.

No, No, No, No, No, No, ...

I need to stop banging my head on a wall long enough to write a post. This news story from the AP is, short of Israelis calling off their Lebanon offensive, the worst possible thing that could happen. Why on earth would Israel possibly consider letting Hezbollah survive? So they can get back to planning more attacks, receiving more and longer range rockets from Iran and Syria, and waiting for the most opportune time to hit Israel again (like after the Labor Party of Perez and Barak is in charge)? Oh of course, the Lebanese Army will have to deploy to the border according to the deal. I hope Olmert is planning on giving them free lawn chairs and lemonade so they can at least be comfortable while they watch Hezbollah launch rockets into Israel because that’s all they will be able to do.

If Israel calls off her offensive without destroying Hezbollah, there will be no stopping them in Lebanon. They would have taken on the mighty Israeli Defense Forces and won; a feat no one else in the world can lay claim to. What are the odds a typical Lebanese soldier will be willing to take on Hezbollah after that? What will happen to Hezbollah’s popularity in Lebanon after they defeat Israel (which is what not destroying Hezbollah will be)? How much higher will it go above that after Hezbollah rushes money and workers around to rebuild the destruction Israel is causing? We have seen how much more trouble Hamas is now that it’s the government of Gaza and not just a faction. How can Olmert expect that Hezbollah, after it rides its popularity and show of strength to dominance in Lebanon, will not become every bit as bigger a problem as Hamas has? This time the Israelis can deal with only Hezbollah, next time they will have to deal with all of Lebanon.

This is also very bad as regards the democracies’ ability to deal with foreign threats. Hezbollah isn’t even a possible future threat; they are a threat here and now to Israel. If Israel, the toughest of all the democracies, quits this quickly after a raid into her own territory kills 8 soldiers with 2 kidnapped, after one of her missile corvettes is hit by a missile, after hundreds of rockets rain down on her civilians, then this portends very bad things for the free world. The Jews are the canary in the mine shaft, and the canary is not is not predicting very good things for us right now. From history I know why free societies are like this, but still, why do we have to keep waiting for problems to require millions or tens of millions of deaths before we will deal with them? Aren't we smarter than that? I really hope this is just a deception campaign so the ground invasion gains some level of surprise, but just in case it isn't I'm going back to banging my head on a wall.